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Article

Evidentiary Irony and the Incomplete Rule of
Completeness: A Proposal to Amend Federal
Rule of Evidence 106
Daniel J. Capra† and Liesa L. Richter††
“[T]he witness may have ‘told the truth, but used it like a lie.’”1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been many calls and suggestions for a
more equitable criminal justice system.2 Although sometimes overlooked in that dialogue, the fair operation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is a crucial component in ensuring such an equitable system.
Unfortunately, there are certain rules—and rule applications—that
can lead to unfair results. For example, assume that a law enforcement
witness in a homicide prosecution testifies that the accused defendant
orally confessed to buying the firearm used to commit the murder—
but conveniently fails to explain that the defendant, in his statement,

† Philip Reed Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Reporter to the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. All views expressed in this Article
are those of the authors individually and do not represent the official views of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. Copyright © 2020 by Daniel J. Capra.
†† William J. Alley Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. Academic Consultant to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules.
Our sincere appreciation goes to James Brudney, Deborah Denno, Bruce Green, James
Kainen, Michael W. Martin, Paul Radvany, Ian Weinstein, and Benjamin Zipursky for
their thoughtful comments on a draft of this Article, as well as to Allyson Shumaker,
J.D. University of Oklahoma, 2021, for her invaluable research support. Copyright ©
2020 by Liesa L. Richter.
1. 7 DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN PRACTICE: WISCONSIN EVIDENCE § 107.1 (4th ed.
2019) (quoting EURIPIDES, THE BACCHAE OF EURIPIDES 67 (Donald Sutherland trans.,
1968)).
2. See, e.g., First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194,
5222 (permitting a court to order a reduced sentence for a crime committed before the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 as if the act had been in place at the time of sentencing).
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also emphasized that he sold the weapon months before the murder.3
The prosecution has dissected the defendant’s statement in a manner
that creates a misleading impression about what he actually stated. A
reasonable juror hearing only that the defendant admitted buying the
weapon would logically assume that he admitted owning the gun at
the crucial time of the murder. Evidence rules that permit such a distorted and inaccurate presentation of a statement, and that deny the
wronged defendant any remedy, fall far short of the equitable ideal.
And yet, the interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 106 in
some jurisdictions permits such an unjust result. Rule 106, also known
as the “rule of completeness,” is premised upon notions of fundamental fairness and ostensibly permits a party to force its adversary to introduce the remainder of a written or recorded statement when the
adversary has offered a portion in a selective and misleading manner.4
In one important respect, the federal courts have applied Rule 106
uniformly. They have properly interpreted the fairness threshold for
invoking the Rule narrowly, recognizing the need for completion only
when the first-introduced statement creates an inaccurate and distorted inference about its true meaning and the completing statement
is necessary to eliminate the distortion and to make the statement accurate as a whole.5 So limited, Rule 106 is a critical tool necessary to
achieving the underlying fairness goals of the Federal Rules of Evidence generally, as outlined in Rule 102: “These rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence
law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”6
Despite these important principles, inconsistent and unfair application of Rule 106 has plagued the Rule since its adoption in 1975 and
has frustrated its core purpose of demanding fair presentation of out3. See United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 664 (D. Md. 2017) (describing
this scenario as a “classic” example of distortion).
4. FED. R. EVID. 106.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 58, 60 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that the prosecution’s introduction of the defendant’s confession to owning a firearm did not require completion with the defendant’s earlier denial of ownership; omission of the initial denial did not distort or alter the meaning of the subsequent
confession); United States v. Hird, 901 F.3d 196, 217 (3d Cir. 2018) (rejecting completion where the excerpt of testimony defendant sought to admit “occurs many pages
before the testimony” offered by the prosecution, was “separated by the passage of
time during questioning” and was “unrelated in the overall sequence of questions”),
superseded on reh’g, 913 F.3d 332 (2019) (quoted portion of decision unchanged).
6. FED. R. EVID. 102 (emphasis added).
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of-court statements. Most significantly, a defendant like the hypothetical murder defendant described above will run headlong into a prosecutorial hearsay objection when he attempts to utilize Rule 106. The
prosecution will emphasize that the government may introduce the
defendant’s own statements against him pursuant to the hearsay exemption for party opponent statements found in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). But it will argue—correctly—that the defendant
may not introduce his own hearsay statements under that one-way exemption.7 The prosecution can claim that the completion right found
in Rule 106 does not trump the hearsay doctrine. In jurisdictions that
accept this argument and sustain the prosecution’s objection, the jury
is left with the impression that the defendant admitted to owning the
murder weapon at the time of the killing, when he did no such thing.
Alternatively, the prosecution may object that the defendant’s confession was made orally and that Rule 106 offers the defendant no recourse because it permits completion only of written or recorded
statements.8 Again, if this objection is sustained, the fact-finder is left
with a distorted scrap of the truth. Due to the ubiquitous use of criminal defendants’ incriminating statements by prosecutors, the risk of
unfair cherry picking has the potential to arise with great frequency.
The unfair application of a rule designed to promote fairness was
made possible because the original drafters of Rule 106 chose to craft
a rule of completeness that only “partially” codified the common law
doctrine of completeness.9 The drafting history of Rule 106 reveals
that its creators were focused primarily upon the timing of completion
and crafted a rule creating a right to “interrupt” an adversary’s trial
presentation to demand completion of a partial and misleading statement “at that time.”10 This focus on timing led the drafters to include
only “writings” or “recorded” statements in the text of Rule 106, on
the theory that proof of unrecorded oral statements would

7. See Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 662 (“[T]he Government argued that anything
Bailey told the agents . . . that [the government] intended to introduce during its case
in chief would be admissible non-hearsay, but that anything exculpatory that Bailey
told them that he intended to elicit . . . would be inadmissible hearsay.”); cf. United
States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Rule 801(d)(2), however, ‘does
not extend to a party’s attempt to introduce his or her own statements through the
testimony of other witnesses.’”).
8. See FED. R. EVID. 106 (applying only to “a writing or recorded statement”).
9. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171–72 (1988) (stating that
Rule 106 is a partial codification of the common law rule of completeness).
10. See FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note (noting “the inadequacy of repair work” when completion is delayed to a later point in a trial).
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unnecessarily interrupt direct examination.11 But expressly covering
only writings and recordings in Rule 106 text has left completing oral
statements out in the cold to be admitted through common law doctrines, other evidence rules, or not at all. Most importantly, Rule 106—
which is a rule about the admission of out-of-court statements—
makes no mention of the hearsay rule that could be held to prevent
completion with otherwise inadmissible statements.
This incomplete rule of completeness has left federal courts
struggling for decades with objections to oral statements and otherwise inadmissible hearsay offered to correct a misleading partial
presentation of a statement. Although many federal courts admit oral
statements and otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements when necessary to correct a misleading impression created by a partial presentation like the one posited above, others do not.12 In some federal jurisdictions, therefore, the scenario presented above is a shocking
reality—statements are presented in a misleading way and stand uncorrected. While that injustice could be visited on any litigant, it most
often falls on criminal defendants.
Although the federal courts have been wrestling with the proper
operation of Rule 106 since its adoption, they are no closer to a uniform and just interpretation of the provision than they were forty-five
years ago. Accordingly, Rule 106 should be reconstructed to allow
completion of oral statements and to permit completion with otherwise inadmissible hearsay whenever necessary to prevent distorted
evidence from influencing the fact-finder improperly. Only then will
the “rule of completeness” be truly complete.
This Article addresses the need to amend Rule 106 in four Parts.
Part I describes the pre-Rules common law doctrine of completeness
from which the more limited Federal Rule of Evidence 106 was
crafted. Part I then traces the adoption of Rule 106 and the drafters’
decision to “partially” codify the common law doctrine of completeness. Part II examines the federal cases and commentary interpreting
Rule 106 since its adoption in 1975. Part II highlights the conflict and
confusion surrounding Rule 106, revealing that it is high time for a
change to bring fairness and uniformity to the rule of completion. Part
III explores potential amendment alternatives for Rule 106 designed
to address the fairness deficit currently permitted by some interpretations of the Rule and to create the uniformity across federal jurisdictions that the Federal Rules of Evidence were designed to establish.
11. See id. (“For practical reasons, the rule is limited to writings and recorded
statements and does not apply to conversations.”).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 826–27 (6th Cir. 2013).
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Part IV concludes with a call to action, recommending an amendment
to Rule 106 that would complete the work on a meaningful and just
rule of completion—by allowing completion over a hearsay objection,
and by covering oral statements specifically under the Rule.13
I. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 106: THE ORIGIN STORY
American trials follow a formulaic order of proof, in which each
party has an opportunity to prove her case or defense at an appointed
stage of the proceeding.14 During her turn, counsel seeks to present
evidence that maximizes her client’s likelihood of success. Although
an adversary enjoys the right to object to evidence presented during
her opponent’s case and to cross-examine witnesses, she must wait
her turn to present counterproof helpful to her client’s position.15
The doctrine of completion represents one limited exception to
this standard operating procedure, forbidding a party from “[telling]
the truth, but us[ing] it like a lie” during her presentation of proof.16 It
prevents a party from using her right to present evidence during her
case in chief in a way that would mislead the fact-finder, by allowing
an adversary to interject with completing evidence whenever a party
presents a partial statement in a way that distorts its true tenor.17
A. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF COMPLETENESS
The concept of completeness is one of fundamental fairness that
courts have applied in some form since at least the seventeenth century.18 In a leading case in 1897, Carver v. United States, the defendant
13. Although this Article focuses on the significant impact of Rule 106 in the context of a defendant’s statements in a criminal case, this amendment would be advantageous to all litigants in civil and criminal cases alike.
14. See 1 WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 106-2.1 (Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger eds.,
1992) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN] (“American trial practice has traditionally given each
side freedom to present the evidence favoring his side alone.”).
15. FED. R. EVID. 103 (requiring a timely objection to an adversary’s evidence);
FED. R. EVID. 611(b) (limiting cross-examination that is outside the subject matter of
the direct examination).
16. See BLINKA, supra note 1.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 575–76 (2d Cir. 1987) (allowing
completion only when necessary “to explain the [partial statement], to place [partial
statements] in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair and impartial
understanding”).
18. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2094 (2d ed. 1923) (describing the famous seventeenth century English trial of Algernon Sidney for sedition and illustrating the importance of completeness).
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was convicted for murder after he shot his mistress.19 The Supreme
Court reversed his conviction due to a number of errors, including refusal to allow the defendant’s witnesses to testify to what was said between the defendant and his mistress at the scene of the crime—after
government witnesses were permitted to testify to a part of the same
conversation. In finding error, the Court noted:
If it were competent for one party to prove this conversation, it was equally
competent for the other party to prove their version of it. . . . [W]here the
whole or a part of a conversation has been put in evidence by one party, the
other party is entitled to explain, vary, or contradict it.20

New York’s Field Code marked the first attempt to codify the
broad common law completeness doctrine in 1850, as follows:
When part of an act, declaration, conversation or writing is given in evidence
by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by the
other; when a letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached
act, declaration, conversation or writing is given in evidence, any other act,
declaration, conversation or writing, which is necessary to make it understood, may also be given in evidence.21

This version of the principle of completeness was quite expansive, encompassing the partial presentation of “acts,” as well as utterances, and suggesting that a party may not make partial presentations
at all. This broad formulation of the completion doctrine suggests that
“the whole on the same subject” may be inquired into by an adversary
whenever a part of a statement or event is presented.22
Later, Dean Wigmore would characterize the doctrine more narrowly as one of “verbal completeness” requiring that the whole of a
“verbal utterance” on a single topic or transaction be taken together.23
Wigmore justified the exclusion of acts and occurrences from the doctrine of completeness on the grounds that, inter alia, acts are rarely so
“inseparably united” that presentation of a single act or occurrence
19. Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 694–95 (1897).
20. Id. at 696–97 (emphasis added); see also Stevenson v. United States, 86 F. 106,
111 (5th Cir. 1898) (citing 1 BISH. CR. PROC. § 1241; Carver, 164 U.S. at 696) (explaining
that it is “elementary” that “[w]here one part of a conversation is introduced, the other
party is entitled to all that relates to the same subject, and all that may be necessary to
fully understand the portion given”); Jackson v. State, 60 Ga. App. 142 (1939) (same).
21. 21A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5071 (2d ed. 2020) (quoting N.Y. COMM’RS ON
PRAC. & PLEADINGS, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 1687, at
704–05 (1850)).
22. Id. (e.g., “when a letter is read, the answer may be given”).
23. 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2094, at 594–95
(revised by James H. Chadbourn, 1978). For an in-depth study of the “complexity and
confusion” surrounding the common law doctrine of completeness, see Dale A. Nance,
A Theory of Verbal Completeness, 80 IOWA L. REV. 825, 829–60 (1995).
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would mislead the fact-finder without presentation of others.24 In contrast, Wigmore emphasized that verbal utterances are “attempts to express ideas in words” and that words may easily be distorted by presenting them in a piecemeal fashion out of context.25 Wigmore
cautioned that only remainders that concern the “same subject matter” and that explain the initially admitted utterance should be admitted for purposes of completion.26
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Evidence
Rules or Rules), courts permitted completion of both written and oral
utterances, although they acknowledged the practical difficulties inherent in determining the “whole” of an oral utterance.27 With respect
to written utterances, checking for verbal precision and context was
made relatively easy due to a written record of the precise utterances
made.28 In light of the challenges inherent in requiring verbal precision and entirety for oral utterances, courts typically accepted completion of oral statements when needed to provide the true “substance
or effect” of a conversation.29 Wigmore concluded that disputes about
the accuracy of a witness’s recollection of an oral statement constituted questions of credibility for the jury.30
With respect to the timing of completion, Wigmore articulated
two categories of completion: “compulsory” and “optional.”31 Compulsory completeness represented the root of the modern interruption
rule and required the proponent of an utterance to present the completing portion of a statement during her initial presentation.32 Optional completeness on the other hand did not mandate completion by
24. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2094, at 594.
25. Id. at 595.
26. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2113, at 508–09; see also 1 CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1:42, at 285 (4th ed. 2013) (noting
that completion required a fact-specific inquiry and that courts considered factors
such as “the nature of the part of a statement that is first offered, the nature of the
balance, who offers the statement, what it is offered to prove, and the issues in suit”
(citing 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2094 (3d ed. 1940))).
27. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 106-4 to -5.
28. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 23, §§ 2102, 2104.
29. Id. § 2097, at 608–09 (“The general rule, universally accepted, is therefore
that the substance or effect of the actual words spoken will suffice, the witness stating
this substance as best he can from the impression left upon his memory. He may give
his ‘understanding’ or ‘impression’ as to the net meaning of the words heard.”).
30. Id. (quoting Bathrick v. Detroit Post & Trib. Co., 16 N.W. 172, 175 (Mich.
1883)).
31. Id. § 2095, at 607.
32. Id. (explaining that compulsory completeness means that a proponent of an
utterance “can offer no part unless he offers the whole”).
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the original proponent of a statement, but rather permitted the opponent of the initial statement to present the completing remainder herself, either on cross-examination of the witness who testified to the
partial statement, or later during her own case.33 Although there was
some conflict in the cases concerning the proper timing of completion,
optional completion of both written and oral statements by an opponent during cross-examination or her own case was commonly allowed.34 In contrast, courts were more reluctant to require “interruption” of a proponent’s case to complete partially presented
statements, particularly oral statements.35 Wigmore defended this reluctance, noting that the “whole” of an oral conversation is less distinct
than the entirety of a written document, and that multiple witnesses
might be required to convey the entirety of an oral conversation—
making compulsory completion during the proponent’s case in chief a
more difficult enterprise.36
Common-law courts also grappled with the issue of completing
statements that were otherwise inadmissible. For example, in Rosenberg v. Wittenborn, the plaintiff in an accident case elicited from a police officer the defendant’s damning admissions at the scene of the accident that his light was “red” when he entered the intersection and
that he was going approximately “30 miles per hour.”37 When the defense sought to ask the officer on cross about the defendant’s simultaneous explanation that he went through the red light because his
brakes failed, the plaintiff raised a hearsay objection.38 The California
Court of Appeal found that completion with otherwise inadmissible
hearsay was necessary to provide a fair depiction of the defendant’s
statements at the scene of the accident:
Considerations of fair play demanded that the portion of the conversation
placed in evidence by plaintiffs be supplemented by the qualifying and

33. Id. § 2113, at 653–54.
34. Id. § 2099, at 618 (noting the “copious rulings allowing the opponent afterwards to put in the remainder” of an oral utterance and “the absence of rulings requiring the proponent to put in the whole at first”); id. § 2113, at 653 (“[T]here is and could
be no difference of opinion as to the opponent’s right, if a part only has been put in,
himself to put in the remainder. Indeed, it is the very fact of this later opportunity and
right which . . . has frequent bearing upon the question whether it is worthwhile to
require it from the proponent in the first instance.”).
35. Id. § 2099, at 618 (explaining that judges only required a proponent to admit
a remainder during its own presentation in special circumstances, such as when presenting former testimony).
36. Id. at 619.
37. Rosenberg v. Wittenborn, 3 Cal. Rptr. 459, 462 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
38. Id.
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enlightening portions of the conversation which gave it a very different complexion than that which the plaintiffs’ segregated passages bore.39

Wigmore recognized that remainders such as this one ordinarily
would constitute inadmissible hearsay if offered to prove the truth of
the completing statement and suggested that the remainder should be
used only to give “context” to the portion of the statement already admitted and should not be used as substantive evidence.40 But most
common-law courts disagreed with this “context only” approach to
the evidentiary value of a completing remainder.41 Courts frequently
permitted completion with an otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement without limiting the purpose for which the completing remainder was admitted. Some courts went so far as to characterize the right
to complete as supplying an “independent exception to the rule
against hearsay.”42

39. Id. at 463; see also Rokus v. City of Bridgeport, 463 A.2d 252, 256 (Conn. 1983)
(explaining that the trial court erred in excluding on hearsay grounds defendant’s completing statement that he “did not see” the plaintiff because the plaintiff “ran in front of
[the] truck” just before the accident).
40. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2100, at 626 (“[T]he complementary and exculpatory part of the confession is put in, not as testimony, but merely as qualifying the
effect of the confessing portions . . . .”). Some have suggested that Wigmore ultimately
expressed some doubt on this non-hearsay theory of admissibility. See Nance, supra
note 23, at 842–43, 843 n.57.
41. See 7 WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2113, at 660 (“[I]t is not uncommon for courts
to treat the remaining utterance, thus put in, as having a legitimate assertive and testimonial value of its own—as if, having once got in, it could be used for any purpose
whatever.”); Simmons v. State, 105 So. 2d 691, 694 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958) (“[Completeness] makes admissible self-serving statements which otherwise would be inadmissible.”); Storer v. Gowen, 18 Me. 174, 176–77 (1841) (arguing that completing remainders “are equally evidence to the jury” as prior admitted statements); Michael A.
Hardin, This Space Intentionally Left Blank: What to Do When Hearsay and Rule 106
Completeness Collide, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1299 (2013) (noting that the “context
only” approach “has never been universally accepted” (citing Simmons, 105 So. 2d at
694)); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 5072.1 (“[T]he major purpose of the common
law completeness doctrine was to provide an exception to those rules that prevented
the opponent from showing how the proponent had misled the jury.”).
42. Rokus, 463 A.2d at 256; see also Stevenson v. United States, 86 F. 106, 110–11
(5th Cir. 1898) (“[W]hen the United States proved the conversations and declarations
the accused was entitled to have the full conversation or conversations given in evidence.”); CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING TO
THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE: ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY EVIDENCE 599 (1962) (“To the
extent that this section makes hearsay admissible, we may regard the section as a special exception to the hearsay rule.”); Nance, supra note 23, at 839–40 (explaining that
courts routinely permitted the presentation of otherwise inadmissible evidence—
most commonly hearsay evidence—if it was necessary to offer a complete picture of
the fragmented evidence already introduced).
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With respect to confessions of a criminal defendant¾the most
common context in which completeness issues arise today¾preRules courts generally demanded admission of an entire confession
when the prosecution sought to use some portions. In United States v.
Wenzel,43 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals described the rule regarding completion of a defendant’s confession as follows:
When a confession is admissible, the whole of what the accused said upon the
subject at the time of making the confession is admissible and should be
taken together; and if the prosecution fails to prove the whole statement, the
accused is entitled to put in evidence all that was said to and by him at the
time which bears upon the subject of controversy including any exculpatory
or self-serving declarations connected therewith.44

In sum, at common law, parties were permitted to complete both
written and oral statements first presented in fragmented form by
their adversaries. While the courts employed numerous linguistic formulas to describe the circumstances in which completion was required, courts generally permitted completion to prevent a misleading impression that would be created by taking the first fragment out
of context.45 Courts were cautious about allowing an opponent to interrupt his adversary’s case to require the presentation of a remainder, particularly with oral statements.46 More commonly, courts permitted an opponent to engage in “optional” completeness during
cross-examination of his adversary’s witnesses or during his own
case.47 Finally, the majority of common law courts allowed the completion right to “trump” other evidentiary restrictions and permitted
admission of completing remainders that would have been inadmissible had the proponent not introduced a partial, misleading statement.48
B. THE INCOMPLETE RULE OF COMPLETENESS: FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
106
When the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, the doctrine
of completeness was addressed in Rule 106.49 Ironically, the Rule
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

United States v. Wenzel, 311 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 168 (quoting 20 AM. JUR. § 488, at 425 (1939)).
7 WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2113, at 653.
Id. § 2099, at 618.
Id. § 2113, at 653–54.
Nance, supra note 23, at 839–40.
As originally proposed, the rule of completeness was Rule 107. See REVISED
DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE, 51 F.R.D. 315, 329 (1971). It was renumbered
Rule 106 after a proposed rule allowing a trial judge to comment on the evidence was
deleted by Congress. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 5071.
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ultimately adopted to address the need for a fair and complete presentation of a thought or idea codified the common law conception of
“completion” only partially or incompletely—an incomplete statement of the rule of completeness.50 In its current form, Rule 106 reads:
If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse
party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part¾or any
other writing or recorded statement¾that in fairness ought to be considered
at the same time.51

The principal advancement of the codification was the creation of
a right to interrupt a proponent’s preferred presentation of his case to
require him to introduce completing information “at that time.”52 The
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules (Advisory Committee or Committee) noted that the provision was based upon two considerations:
(1) “the misleading impression created by taking matters out of context,” and (2) “the inadequacy of repair work when delayed to a later
point in the trial.”53 Requiring immediate completion addresses multiple concerns, such as a jury’s genuine inability to reconsider a
tainted view of the case created by an earlier partial presentation, as
well as the inherent benefits of considering related information holistically rather than piecemeal.54
Unlike the common law rule, Rule 106 was limited to “writing[s]”
and “recorded statement[s],” thus omitting oral unrecorded statements from its coverage. Although the earliest draft of the completeness rule included a right to complete “conversations,” the final draft
of Rule 106 omitted oral statements for “practical reasons.”55 In justification of the exclusion, the Reporter for the Advisory Committee suggested that oral statements were deleted because “the general outline
of a conversation is less definite than documentary evidence and exploration of what in fairness ought to be considered with respect to a
50. See FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note (providing that the rule is “an
expression of the rule of completeness”).
51. FED. R. EVID. 106. The rule was gender-neutralized in 1987 and restyled in
2011, but it has not been substantively altered since its adoption. See FED. R. EVID. 106
advisory committee’s notes to 1987 and 2011 amendments.
52. FED. R. EVID. 106.
53. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note.
54. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 5072.1; Nance, supra note 23, at 868 (“Not
only do we worry that the misimpression cannot be corrected by delayed response,
but also we see no good reason to impose the additional burden on the trier of fact
necessary to make the connection.”).
55. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note (“For practical reasons, the rule is
limited to writings and recorded statements and does not apply to conversations.”).
For the language of the original draft of the completeness Rule 1-10, see WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 21, § 5071.
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conversation is likely to involve a more discursive and time-consuming inquiry.”56 The Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 106 cautioned
that “[t]he rule does not in any way circumscribe the right of the adversary to develop the matter on cross-examination or as part of his
own case,” signaling that common law protections applicable to incomplete oral statements survived the codification.57
In defining the elusive circumstances in which completion is required, the Advisory Committee rejected an expansive “relevance”
standard and chose the language of “fairness” from the many common
law descriptors used to limit completion.58 The Committee selected
the “fairness” standard because it mirrored the language of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 32, which already permitted completion of selected portions of depositions used at trial.59 During the drafting process, the Department of Justice (DOJ) objected to the “fairness” standard, complaining that it was “vague,” failed to provide “necessary
guidance,” and could “be utilized to usurp the function of cross-examination by permitting one party to disrupt the orderly presentation of
evidence by the other by moving into evidence, under a claim of fairness, other documents which properly should be admitted only in its
own case.”60 The DOJ proposed language for Rule 106 that would have
permitted contemporaneous completion only with portions of the
“same document” on the “same subject matter.”61 The Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court all rejected the
DOJ’s proposal and proceeded with the “fairness” limit on the completion right.62
56. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 5071; see also United States v. Bailey, 322 F.
Supp. 3d 661, 670 (D. Md. 2017) (noting that the “practical reasons” for excluding oral
conversations from Rule 106 “undoubtedly include the need to avoid ‘he said, she said’
disputes about the content of an unrecorded or unwritten statement”).
57. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note.
58. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 5071 (noting that earliest draft of completeness rule was an expansive one that utilized a relevance standard).
59. See FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note (“[Rule 106] is manifested as
to depositions in Rule 32(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of which the
proposed rule is substantially a restatement.”).
60. WEINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 106-7 n.12; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21,
§ 5071 (detailing a letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to Chief
Justice Warren Burger).
61. Apparently, “several powerful Senators” threatened “that failure to accede to
the [Justice] Department’s demands might endanger the Supreme Court’s rulemaking
power.” WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 5071; see Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter,
Poetry in Motion: The Federal Rules of Evidence and Forward Progress as an Imperative,
99 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1910 (2019) (describing DOJ efforts to influence rulemaking proposals through threats of congressional involvement).
62. FED. R. EVID. 106.
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Rule 106 was mysteriously silent as to the admissibility of completing remainders that would otherwise constitute inadmissible
hearsay. Here too, the DOJ attempted to limit completing evidence to
that which would be “otherwise admissible,” thereby allowing the
hearsay prohibition to defeat completion.63 The DOJ formally sought
this modification in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, but the Committee made no change to the Rule, leaving
Rule 106 textually ambiguous on this crucial point.64
***
In sum, Federal Rule of Evidence 106 codified only what was recognized as “compulsory” or immediate completion of written and recorded statements at common law. The Rule omitted oral statements
from the interruption rule, making compulsory completion of oral
statements unavailable, but emphasized in Advisory Committee notes
that optional completion of oral statements by an opponent would still
be permissible. Importantly, the language of Rule 106 maintained silence with respect to the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence to
complete.
II. A NEVER-ENDING STORY: CONFLICT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
REGARDING RULE 106
Since the enactment of Rule 106, the federal cases interpreting it
have revealed a conflicting narrative. On the one hand, the federal
courts have presented a united front in taking a uniformly restrictive
view of the “fairness” standard justifying completion under the Rule.65
63. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 5071 (explaining that the DOJ sought to add
language to the rule requiring a completing remainder to be “otherwise admissible” or
for which a proper foundation is laid).
64. Id. § 5078.1.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 61 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that
completion was not required because the defendant’s initial exculpatory statements
did not make his subsequent confession misleading); United States v. Hird, 901 F.3d
196, 217 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that portions of the defendant’s grand jury testimony
were not admissible to complete other excerpts presented by the government because
they were “unrelated in the overall sequence of questions and to the answers” already
presented); United States v. Dotson, 715 F.3d 576, 583 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that
the defendant’s statements that he had a rough upbringing, had been sexually abused
as a child, and was concerned that the victim knew he was exploiting her were not
admissible to complete his contemporaneous admission to making videos and photos
of a minor victim in a child pornography and exploitation case); United States v.
Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 731 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant’s statement denying that he fired a weapon at a Waco compound was not admissible to complete his
admission to donning battle dress and picking up guns when he saw ATF agents approaching; the prosecution was for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence).
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Only when the portion of a statement initially introduced creates a
distorted and misleading impression about the statement itself have
federal courts honored calls for completeness.66 The D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals accurately captured the tenor of Rule 106 precedent when
it stated that “[i]n almost all cases we think Rule 106 will be invoked
rarely and for a limited purpose.”67 This narrow interpretation of the
trigger for the completion right is entirely appropriate and should not
be altered.
With respect to almost every other interpretive issue arising under Rule 106, however, the federal cases are marked by conflict, confusion, and mixed messages. Most importantly, Rule 106 is plagued by
questions concerning: (1) the admissibility of completing statements
that are hearsay, and (2) the admissibility of completing oral statements not covered by the Rule.
A. THE COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPLETENESS AND THE
HEARSAY RULE
The federal courts have grappled with the problem of completing
statements that are otherwise inadmissible due to the ban on hearsay
evidence. Some circuits permit the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay through the doctrine of completion when it is necessary
to prevent a distorted impression created by a previously admitted
portion of the same statement. Other circuits reject completion with
otherwise inadmissible hearsay altogether, allowing a distorted view
of the evidence to go uncorrected. Still others permit the admission of
a completing statement over a hearsay objection, but only for its “nonhearsay value” in providing context for the original partial statement
and not for the truth of the remainder. Adding to the confusion, there

66. See, e.g., United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that, in a felon firearm possession case, prosecution’s presentation of a portion of the
defendant’s statement admitting knowledge of marijuana found near a weapon misleadingly suggested knowledge of the nearby firearm; the defendant’s simultaneous
denial of knowledge of the gun was required to complete); United States v. CastroCabrera, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (admitting only the defendant’s
second answer to question about his citizenship in which he stated, “I guess Mexico
until my mother files a petition” misrepresented the tenor of his testimony because he
stated “[h]opefully United States through my mother” immediately prior to making the
admitted statement).
67. United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also United
States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 668 (D. Md. 2017) (“Rule 106 should never come
into play unless misleading evidence has been introduced that requires clarification or
explanation—otherwise there is no unfairness that needs correction.”).
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are some federal circuits within which a trial judge can find support
for more than one of these approaches.68
1. Completion as a Trump Card
Many federal courts have held that the “fairness” standard incorporated in Rule 106 requires the admission of otherwise inadmissible
hearsay when it is necessary to prevent a distorted impression of a
previously admitted partial statement. The well-reasoned opinion of
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Sutton reflects this
view.69
In Sutton, a defendant was convicted in connection with a conspiracy to bribe federal officials.70 At trial, the government introduced
select portions of recorded conversations between the defendant and
an alleged coconspirator. According to the D.C. Circuit, the portions of
the conversations introduced by the government incriminated the defendant because they created the impression that he was afraid that
certain individuals would reveal his role in the conspiracy: “In short,
the government’s evidence tended to show Sucher’s consciousness of
guilt.”71 The defendant claimed that the statements presented by the
government did not suggest his criminal intent when viewed alongside other statements he made in the same recording which were
omitted from the government’s presentation. The defendant sought to
have these statements admitted through Rule 106 to demonstrate that
the true tenor of his recorded conversations suggested not that he was
guilty, but rather that he was afraid of falsehoods that certain individuals might tell the government. The trial court sustained the government’s hearsay objection when the defendant attempted to admit his
own completing statements and the defendant appealed.72
The D.C. Circuit provided five important reasons for allowing the
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay in the name of completeness. First, the court pointed to the placement of Rule 106 within the
Evidence Rules scheme:
The structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates that Rule 106 is concerned with more than merely the order of proof. Rule 106 is found not in
68. Compare United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding a completing statement was properly admitted under Rule 106 over a hearsay objection), with United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 135 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that
defendant’s web postings were not admissible under Rule 106 because they were
hearsay).
69. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1367.
72. Id. at 1346.
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Rule 611, which governs the “Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation,” but in Article I, which contains rules that generally restrict the manner of applying the exclusionary rules.73

Second, the court highlighted Rule 106’s omission of the proviso
commonly found in evidentiary provisions intended to be limited by
other exclusionary principles: “[E]xcept as otherwise provided by
these rules.”74 Had the drafters intended to limit the admission of
hearsay through Rule 106, the court reasoned, they would have included this familiar clause. Third, the court referenced the DOJ’s efforts to defeat the admissibility of hearsay by proposing the addition
of this exact proviso—and the ultimate rejection of this DOJ request.75
Fourth, the court noted that Rule 106 was patterned after the California rule of completeness, and that the California rule was known to
allow for admissibility of hearsay.76 Fifth and most importantly, the
Sutton court concluded as a matter of policy that Rule 106 can fulfill
its promise of “fairness” only if it permits the admission of some hearsay that would have been inadmissible but for the need to complete:
“A contrary construction raises the specter of distorted and misleading trials, and creates difficulties for both litigants and the trial
court.”77
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Haddad echoed the sentiments of the Sutton court in holding that a defendant’s exculpatory
statements should have been admitted in the name of completeness.78
In that case, the defendant was charged with being a felon knowingly
in possession of “one Intratec TEC–9, 9 millimeter, semi-automatic
pistol” after it was found in his apartment during the execution of a
search warrant.79 During the execution of the search warrant, the defendant admitted to a local police officer that the marijuana found
near the pistol belonged to him, but denied any knowledge of the gun.
At trial, the officer testified about the defendant’s admission to possessing the nearby marijuana, to show that the defendant knew the
gun was there if he knew the nearby drugs were there. The trial court
sustained a prosecution hearsay objection when the defense sought to
ask about the remainder of the statement expressly disavowing
knowledge of the pistol.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1368.
Id.
Id. at 1368 n.17.
Id.
Id. at 1368.
United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1254.
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The defense argued that the exculpatory statement was “part and
parcel” of the statement introduced by the prosecution, and the Seventh Circuit agreed. The court held that completion was required, over
a hearsay objection, because the remainder was necessary to dispel a
misleading inference created by the government’s portion of the statement:
The defendant in effect said “Yes, I knew of the marijuana but I had no
knowledge of the gun.” The admission of the inculpatory portion only (i.e.
that he knew of the location of the marijuana) might suggest, absent more,
that the defendant also knew of the gun. The whole statement should be admitted in the interest of completeness and context, to avoid misleading inferences, and to help insure a fair and impartial understanding of the evidence.80

Other circuit courts have similarly interpreted Rule 106 to act as
a trump card in the face of a hearsay objection. In United States v. Bucci,
the First Circuit stated that “case law unambiguously establishes that
the rule of completeness may be invoked to facilitate the introduction
of otherwise inadmissible evidence.”81 And in United States v. Gravely,
the Fourth Circuit rejected a defense hearsay objection when the government sought to complete with portions of the grand jury testimony
of a witness.82 The court reasoned:
The cross-designated portions, while perhaps not admissible standing alone,
are admissible as a remainder of a recorded statement. Fed.R.Evid. 106 allows an adverse party to introduce any other part of a writing or recorded
statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously. The
rule simply speaks to the obvious notion that parties should not be able to lift
selected portions out of context.83

Thus, several circuits have held, consistent with the common law
approach to completeness, that otherwise inadmissible hearsay may
be admitted through Rule 106 if necessary to prevent distortion of a
statement and to ensure fairness.
2. The Hearsay Rule as a Barrier to Fairness
There is a clear split of authority regarding Rule 106, however, as
several circuit opinions have refused to permit completing evidence
over a hearsay objection. The Sixth Circuit opinion in United States v.
Adams represents a classic example of the unfairness perpetuated by

80. Id. at 1259.
81. United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States
v. Harry, 816 F.3d 1268, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that the fairness principle
of Rule 106 “can override the rule excluding hearsay” but finding that fairness did not
require completion in the instant case).
82. United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir. 1988).
83. Id. (citing United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1366–69 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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this interpretation of Rule 106.84 In that case, a state court judge was
accused of conspiring to buy votes and of helping appoint corrupt
members of the Clay County Board of Elections.85 At trial, the government presented portions of a phone recording in which a cooperating
witness, a Ms. White, told the judge about questions she had been
asked during her grand jury testimony. White told the judge that she
had been asked whether he had appointed her as an election officer. The judge responded, “[d]id I appoint you? ([l]augh),” and White
said “[y]eah,” and the judge then said, “I don’t really have any authority to appoint anybody.”86 The last statement was redacted from the
government’s presentation, leaving the jury with the impression that
the defendant had adopted the accusation that he had appointed
White. When the defendant sought to complete the government’s
presentation under Rule 106 with his contemporaneous statement
that he didn’t have authority to make the appointment, the trial court
excluded it as hearsay.
Remarkably, the Sixth Circuit found that the government had presented the evidence unfairly but held that nothing could be done about
it:
Defendants claim that “by severely cropping the transcripts, the government
significantly altered the meaning of what [defendants] actually said.” Although we agree that these examples highlight the government’s unfair presentation of the evidence, this court’s bar against admitting hearsay under Rule
106 leaves defendants without redress.87

Troubled by this result, the Adams panel stated that “should this
court sitting en banc address whether Rule 106 requires that the other
evidence be otherwise admissible, it might consider” all the authorities that have criticized the rule that allows the government to admit
a misleading portion and then object on hearsay grounds to a necessary completion.88

84. United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 2013).
85. Id. at 798.
86. Id. at 827.
87. Id. at 827 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 883 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[Rule 106] does not transform inadmissible hearsay into admissible evidence.”); United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373
(6th Cir. 1982) (“The rule covers an order of proof problem; it is not designed to make
something admissible that should be excluded.”).
88. Adams, 722 F.3d at 826 n.31. The authorities cited by the Adams court were:
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL A. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA., 1-106 FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL § 106.02; CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 21A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5078.1 (2d ed. 2012); Nance, supra
note 23; United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Similarly, in United States v. Hassan, the defendant was charged
with several offenses arising from terrorism activities.89 At trial, the
prosecution admitted a “training video” posted online by the defendant depicting him performing a series of physical fitness workouts and
accompanied by an Arabic phrase, an image of an assault rifle, and references to “strong Muslim[s].”90 The trial court refused to require
completion with comments the defendant posted suggesting that he
did “not support terrorists.”91 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
noting that Rule 106 “does not ‘render admissible the . . . evidence
which is otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rules.’”92 The refusal to permit completion with otherwise inadmissible hearsay not
only conflicts with other circuits that permit the completion right to
trump a hearsay objection, it is also in apparent conflict with the
Gravely opinion discussed above¾also in the Fourth Circuit¾which
allowed the prosecution to complete with otherwise inadmissible
grand jury testimony.93
3. A Fairness Half-Measure
Finally, some courts have addressed otherwise inadmissible remainders by drawing upon the time-honored hearsay tenet that statements are not hearsay at all when they are not offered for the truth of
the matters they assert.94 This approach posits that a completing
89. United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2014).
90. Id. at 134.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 526 (4th Cir. 2008)). The
court also expressed doubt that the jury was misled or confused by the exclusion of the
exculpatory posts. Id. at 135; see also United States v. Hayat, 710 F.3d 875, 896 (9th Cir.
2013) (“Rule 106 ‘does not compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence.’” (quoting United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996), as
amended (Oct. 21, 1996))); United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[A] party cannot use the doctrine of completeness to circumvent Rule 803’s exclusion
of hearsay testimony.”); Collicott, 92 F.3d at 983 (“Because Zaidi’s out-of-court statements to Kehl do not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule, they are inadmissible,
regardless of Rule 106.”); U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335,
1375–76 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The doctrine of completeness, Fed. R. Evid. 106, does not
compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence.”); United States v. Cisneros, 2018 WL 3702497, at 11 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2018) (“If the Court admitted defendant’s exculpatory statements at trial, he ‘would have been able to place his exculpatory
statements “before the jury without subjecting [himself] to cross-examination, precisely what the hearsay rule forbids.”’” (quoting United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675,
682 (9th Cir. 2000))).
93. See United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir. 1988).
94. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2) (defining hearsay as a statement that “a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”).
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statement need not be admitted for its truth to dispel any misconception created by the initial selective presentation of the statement. Under this view, the completing remainder may be admitted over a hearsay objection, but only for its non-hearsay value in providing “context”
for the misleading portion.
This “context” approach can be traced to Wigmore’s interpretation of completion at common law. Although he expressed a minority
view on this point, Wigmore suggested that completing statements
should not be admitted for their truth: “[T]he complementary and exculpatory part of the confession is put in, not as testimony, but merely
as qualifying the effect of the confessing portions.”95 Some support for
the admission of completing remainders for their non-hearsay value
in showing context may also be found in dicta in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey¾the only Supreme Court
opinion to address the completion principle since the adoption of Rule
106.96
In Beech Aircraft, the husband of a deceased navy pilot sued the
manufacturer of an aircraft that crashed during training exercises,
killing his wife and a student pilot. At trial, the husband’s theory was
that a fuel flow malfunction caused the plane to lose engine power,
leading to the fatal crash. The husband did not testify during his own
case, but he was called as an adverse witness by the defense. During
its hostile direct, the defense asked the husband¾who was also a navy
pilot¾about a report he had sent to the navy commander investigating the crash shortly after the accident. Although the full report contained detailed analysis of the accident demonstrating a power failure
as the primary cause of the crash, the defense asked the husband only
about two statements in the report suggesting that his wife attempted
to cancel the ill-fated training flight due to the fatigue of her student
pilot and acknowledging that the plane violated its flight pattern
shortly before the crash. The husband’s counsel sought to ask him on
cross-examination whether the same report also concluded that
power failure caused the crash. The defense promptly objected to the
admission of other parts of the husband’s report¾not on hearsay
grounds but as inadmissible “opinion”—and the trial court sustained
the objection and prevented the husband’s counsel from demonstrating the true tenor of the report.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court had
abused its discretion, finding that Rule 106 permitted the husband to
95. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2100, at 626; see also supra note 41.
96. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171 (1988).
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offer completing information about the report “which would have put
in context the admissions elicited from him on direct.”97 Although the
parties briefed the application of Rule 106 in the Supreme Court, the
Court expressly declined to rule on the scope and meaning of that provision. Instead, the Court held that “general rules of relevancy” provided a “ready resolution” of the case.98 The Court noted that, when
one party creates a distorted impression by presenting a portion of a
document, the material required to dispel the distortion is relevant
and admissible through Rules 401 and 402.99 The Supreme Court
agreed that the trial judge had erred when he refused to allow the husband’s counsel to inquire about the conclusion of the report, finding
that the jury was given a “distorted and prejudicial” view of the report
that suggested that the husband found the accident to have been
caused by pilot error and developed the theory of power failure later
solely for purposes of litigation.100
In dicta in a footnote, the Beech Aircraft Court addressed the hearsay concern raised by the admission of completing out-of-court statements.101 The Court stated that, had the defense raised a hearsay objection to the completing portion of the husband’s report (which it did
not), that objection would not have defeated admissibility, because
the husband’s statement about power failure in his report was “not
offered ‘to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’”102 Instead, it was
offered “simply to prove what [the husband] had said about the accident . . . and to contribute to a fuller understanding of the material the
defense had already placed in evidence.”103 Thus, while the Beech Aircraft opinion suggested a non-hearsay resolution of the issue of completing out-of-court statements, it did so only in dicta discussing a hypothetical trial objection that was never raised and in an opinion that
declined to apply or interpret Rule 106.
A recent opinion by the Second Circuit echoes Beech Aircraft in
suggesting a “context only” non-hearsay approach to completing outof-court statements, but again only in dicta. In United States v. Williams, the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm after officers found a loaded firearm in the console of a rental

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 153–54.
Id. at 172.
See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.
Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 170.
Id. at 173 n.18.
Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(c)).
Id.

922

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:901

car he was driving.104 When confronted with the fact that officers had
found a weapon, the defendant initially denied knowledge of the gun
and claimed to have been returning the rental car. Later, he admitted
to officers that the firearm belonged to him and signed a sworn statement in which he confessed to possessing it. At trial, only the confession was admitted despite the defendant’s efforts to offer his earlier
exculpatory statement under the doctrine of completion.
On appeal, the Second Circuit acknowledged a defendant’s right
to offer completing statements necessary to correct a misimpression
created by the misleading use of a statement, but held that the defendant’s initial self-serving exculpatory statement in no way explained or
modified his subsequent confession: “[T]he rule of completeness does
not require the admission of self-serving exculpatory statements in all
circumstances, and the mere fact that a suspect denies guilt before admitting it, does not—without more—mandate the admission of his
self-serving denial.”105 The court went on to explain that “when the
omitted portion of a statement is properly introduced to correct a misleading impression or place in context that portion already admitted,
it is for this very reason admissible for a valid, nonhearsay purpose: to
explain and ensure the fair understanding of the evidence that has already been introduced.”106 But this hearsay discussion was dictum because the court found that the defendant’s confession was not misleading, and that his exculpatory denial was therefore unnecessary to
complete.
Unlike Williams, other federal opinions obliquely note that hearsay may be admitted under the doctrine of completion to place admitted statements “in context,” without expressly explaining whether the
completing statements may be offered for their truth or only for their
non-hearsay value.107 Courts that allow admission to show context

104. United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2019).
105. Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 60; see also United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“If otherwise inadmissible evidence is necessary to correct a misleading impression,
then either it is admissible for this limited purpose by force of Rule 106 . . . or, if it is
inadmissible (maybe because of privilege), the misleading evidence must be excluded
too.”); WEINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 106-20 to -21 (“[I]t can be argued that if the other
act or writing is merely used to make the one given in evidence understood, it is not
hearsay because it is not ‘offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’”
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(c))).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven
though a statement may be hearsay, an ‘omitted portion of [the] statement must be
placed in evidence if necessary to explain the admitted portion, to place the admitted
portion in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair and impartial
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might be suggesting the non-hearsay solution discussed by Williams
because “context” is classic non-hearsay vocabulary.108 But it seems
more likely that the courts referring to “context” in the Rule 106 arena
are simply describing their rationale for allowing completion in the
first place. Completion is allowed under Rule 106 only when necessary
to provide proper context for a previously admitted statement.
Whether the completing statement is then admissible for its truth presents a separate question. Therefore, it seems probable that most federal courts are not staking out any position on the use to which completing statements may be put when they employ “context” language.
Such language is better understood as shorthand to express that the
Rule 106 standard is satisfied and not as a limitation on the use of the
completing statement for its truth.
***
The federal cases, therefore, offer three distinct views of the interaction between the hearsay rule and the doctrine of completion.
Some hold that otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be offered for its
truth under Rule 106 if necessary to prevent distortion in the partial
presentation of a statement. Others exclude completing out-of-court
statements in the face of a hearsay objection, even when needed to
dispel distortion created by a previous selective presentation. This approach leaves misleading partial statements uncorrected. Still, other
federal courts permit the admission of completing out-of-court statements, but only for their non-hearsay contextual value. And there are
courts that appear not to have confronted how the completing statement may be used after it is admitted.
B. THE PATCHWORK APPROACH TO COMPLETING ORAL STATEMENTS
The interface between the hearsay rule and completion is not the
only interpretive conundrum created by the partial codification of
completeness in Rule 106. Federal courts have also struggled with
trial requests to complete selectively presented oral statements¾statements omitted from Rule 106’s coverage of “writing[s]
or recorded statement[s]” for “practical reasons.”109 As they have with

understanding of the admitted portion.’”(quoting United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571,
575–76 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 844 (1987))).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Barragan, 871 F.3d 689, 705 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
informant’s statements on the tapes were not hearsay because, as the court instructed
the jury, they were offered only for context, not for ‘the truth of the matter asserted.’”
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2))).
109. FED. R. EVID. 106 & advisory committee’s note.
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respect to the hearsay issue, federal courts have adopted various approaches to the completion of oral statements.
1. The Common Law Lives
A few federal courts have found a right to complete misleadingly
presented oral statements in the common law that remains in the gaps
left by the Federal Rules of Evidence.110 For example, in United States
v. Sanjar, the defendant sought to cross-examine a government agent
who had testified on direct about oral statements the defendant had
made to him.111 In seeking to bring out additional statements he had
made to the agent during cross, the defendant relied upon Rule 106,
arguing that it controlled because the agent had later recorded his oral
statements in a summary.
The Fifth Circuit noted that Rule 106, by its terms, applies only to
written and recorded statements and found that it did not govern in a
circumstance where the agent was not asked about and did not rely
upon his summary in answering questions about the defendant’s
statements.112 But the court found that “[t]he common law rule of
completeness, which is just a corollary of the principle that relevant
evidence is generally admissible, does provide a right to cross examine” regarding incomplete oral statements.113 The Fifth Circuit’s reliance on the common law to find a right to complete oral statements
can be traced to the Supreme Court’s decision in Beech Aircraft.114
Taking a page from the Supreme Court’s book on completion, courts
like the Sanjar court have ventured outside the rule book and have
utilized the same “common law” general principles of relevancy to resolve the issue of oral statements left unaddressed by Rule 106.115
110. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1984) (stating that the common
law retains some relevance in interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence).
111. United States v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725, 739 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom,
Main v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1577 (2018).
112. Id. This analysis reveals yet another interpretive difficulty in applying Rule
106—the problem of classifying a statement originally made orally, but later recorded
in some fashion. By leaving oral statements out of Rule 106, the drafters of the original
provision have forced courts to draw the sometimes-awkward distinction between
“oral” and “recorded” statements.
113. Id. Ultimately, the court found common law completion inapplicable to defendant’s circumstance because the defendant’s oral assertions of innocence were
“‘not necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context’ the limited statements the
agent testified about on direct.” Id. (quoting United States v. Self, 414 F. App’x 611, 615
(5th Cir. 2011)).
114. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171 (1988).
115. See United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 670 (D. Md. 2017) (“Rule 106
only partially codifies the common law doctrine of completeness, and for situations
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2. Completing Oral Statements Under Rule 611(a)
The majority of federal courts have avoided resorting to the lingering common law and have instead found authority for the completion of oral statements in Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a).116 Rule
611(a) provides as follows:
CONTROL BY THE COURT; PURPOSES. The court should exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:
make those procedures effective for determining the truth;
avoid wasting time; and
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.117

Although a trial lawyer might not intuitively recognize a right to
completion in a rule designed to control the “mode and order” of examining witnesses, federal courts have connected the right to complete oral statements with the determination of “truth.”
The leading case on unrecorded statements and completeness
under Rule 611(a) is United States v. Castro.118 Two co-defendants
were jointly tried on cocaine-related charges. The government proffered one defendant’s oral statement to an arresting officer that cocaine would be found in a certain bag in the house where he was apprehended. The defendant simultaneously told the officer that the
cocaine belonged to another man who ended up being his co-defendant.119 The defendant argued that presenting only his first statement
pointing the officer to the drugs would create an inference that he had
confessed ownership of the drugs—an inference expressly denied by
his contemporaneous statement attributing ownership to another. He
argued that fairness required admission of his simultaneous statement regarding ownership.120 The trial court refused to admit the defendant’s statement implicating his co-defendant in their joint trial
and, instead permitting the defense to clarify generally during cross-

beyond the reach of Rule 106, the common law still applies.”). But see United States v.
Oloyede, 933 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2019) (expressing doubt that the common law of completion survived the enactment of Rule 106).
116. WEINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 106-4 (noting that Rule 611(a) “provides equivalent control over testimonial proof”).
117. FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
118. United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1987) (balancing the court’s
principles of common sense and fairness with protection of society’s interest in the
truth).
119. Id. at 574.
120. Id. at 575.
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examination of the officer that the defendant had not admitted ownership of the drugs.121
The defendant appealed the exclusion of the remainder of his
statement.122 The Second Circuit found Rule 106 inapplicable to the
defendant’s oral assertions, but turned to Rule 611(a) to find authority for the completion of oral statements not covered by Rule 106.123
The court explained that Rule 611(a) gives trial judges not only the
power to control proceedings to ensure fairness, but an obligation to
do so.124 Accordingly, the court concluded that
whether we operate under Rule 106’s embodiment of the rule of completeness, or under the more general provision of Rule 611(a), we remain guided
by the overarching principle that it is the trial court’s responsibility to exercise common sense and a sense of fairness to protect the rights of the parties . . . .125

Like the court in Castro, the majority of federal circuits have
found authority to require the completion of oral statements that is
missing from Rule 106 in Rule 611(a).126
121. Id. The Supreme Court’s holding in Bruton v. United States prevented admission of defendant’s testimonial statement incriminating his co-defendant in their joint
trial. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 123, 137 (1968).
122. Castro, 813 F.2d at 572.
123. Id. at 575–76.
124. Id. at 576.
125. Id. (finding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying completion because he permitted the defendant to tell the jury that he had denied ownership of the drugs); see also United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 59 (2d Cir. 2019)
(“[I]n this Circuit, the completeness principle applies to oral statements through Rule
611(a) . . . .”).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1409–13 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding unrecorded statements of a government witness were properly admitted to
complete); United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565, 579 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[T]he district
court retained substantial discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) to apply the rule of
completeness to oral statements . . . .” (citing United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d
716, 734 (10th Cir. 2010))); United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“The common law version of the rule was codified for written statements in Fed. R.
Evid. 106, and has since been extended to oral statements through interpretation of
Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).”); United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993)
(finding Rule 611(a) gives the judge the same authority regarding unrecorded statements as Rule 106 grants regarding written and recorded statements); United States
v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that Rule 611 supports a
rule of completeness for unrecorded statements that is the same as that applied to
written and recorded statements under Rule 106); Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 734
(“[W]e have held ‘the rule of completeness embodied in Rule 106 is “substantially applicable to oral testimony,” as well by virtue of Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) . . . .’” (quoting
United States v. Zamudio, 141 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 1998))); United States v. Baker, 432
F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We have extended Rule 106 to oral testimony in
light of Rule 611(a)’s requirement that the district court exercise ‘reasonable control’
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3. Completing Oral Statements Excluded
The third and most troubling approach to oral statements is
found in federal cases that end their analysis of completion with a literal reading of the text of Rule 106. In such cases, courts deny completion of oral statements simply because Rule 106 omits them from coverage. These courts have not looked to Rule 611(a) or the common law
to find a right to completion for purely oral statements.
A prime example of this approach can be found in United States v.
Gibson.127 In that case, the defendant complained that the trial court
erred in preventing defense counsel from cross-examining a former
employee about an unrecorded statement that the defendant made to
him.128 The defendant contended that the government had on direct
inquired into other statements that the defendant had made to the employee, and that the defendant had a right under Rule 106 to introduce
a statement that completed the misleading portion.129 The court disagreed, grounding its analysis only in the fact that “Rule 106 applies
only to written and recorded statements.”130 Further compounding
the confusion surrounding the completion of oral statements, the Gibson case was decided in the Fifth Circuit in 2017¾the same year that
the Fifth Circuit opinion in United States v. Sanjar announced a right to
complete oral statements grounded in the common law.131
Other cases have employed a similarly glib analysis to the completion of oral statements. Cases in the Ninth Circuit have repeatedly
rejected completeness arguments with respect to oral statements
based only on the fact that Rule 106 excludes them from coverage.132
In United States v. Wilkerson, a panel of the Fourth Circuit similarly
disposed of a defendant’s completeness objection relating to oral
statements by holding that “[t]he rule applies only to writings or

over witness interrogation and the presentation of evidence to make them effective
vehicles for the ascertainment of truth.”).
127. United States v. Gibson, 875 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2017).
128. Id. at 183.
129. Id. at 193–94.
130. Id. at 194 n.10.
131. United States v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725, 739 (5th Cir. 2017).
132. United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because the officer’s testimony concerned an unrecorded oral confession, the rule of completeness
does not apply.”); United States v. Hayat, 710 F.3d 875, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur
cases have applied the rule of completeness ‘only to written and recorded statements.’”
(quoting Ortega, 203 F.3d at 682)); United States v. Liera-Morales, 759 F.3d 1105, 1111
(9th Cir. 2014) (“By its terms, Rule 106 ‘applies only to written and recorded statements.’” (quoting Ortega, 203 F.3d at 682)).
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recorded statements, not to conversations.”133 In United States v.
Ramirez-Perez, the Eleventh Circuit offered a particularly perplexing
analysis of the interaction between completion and oral statements.134 In that case, the court held that Rule 106 did not apply to the
defendant’s confession even though it was written and signed, because
the officer who took the confession was asked at trial only about what
the defendant said, not what the defendant wrote down.135 The court
concluded that “[b]ecause the prosecutor questioned the agent only
about what Maclavio said rather than about what was written in the
document, Rule 106 did not apply.”136 The omission of oral statements
from Rule 106 was, therefore, manipulated to defeat the right to complete a written statement covered by the Rule.
Where courts have refused to venture beyond the plain language
of Rule 106 to find a completion right for oral statements in the common law or in Rule 611(a), there is an irrational and unjust distinction
being drawn between selectively presented written and recorded
statements and similarly situated oral statements.
***
As with the hearsay question arising under Rule 106, there are
three approaches in the federal courts to the completion of oral statements. In a few courts, there is apparently no right to complete selective and misleading oral statements. Even in the circuits that permit
completion of partial and distorted oral statements, judges and litigants must hunt through cases to find the right to complete in the
ephemeral haze of common law remaining following the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, or in the vague promise of procedures
that are “effective for determining the truth” in Rule 611(a).
III. COMPLETING CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULE OF
COMPLETENESS
Conflict and confusion have surrounded Rule 106 since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal cases from the 1980s
133. United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996). The court went
on to find that the rule of completeness, “if it applied to oral conversations,” would not
have applied to the case “where there was no partially introduced conversation that
needed clarification or explanation.” Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v.
Oloyede, 933 F.3d 302, 313–14 (4th Cir. 2019) (“While we doubt that a residual common law rule of completeness [that would admit oral statements] survives Rule 106’s
codification, we hold that any such common law rule cannot be used to justify the admission of inadmissible hearsay.”).
134. United States v. Ramirez-Perez, 166 F.3d 1106, 1111–14 (11th Cir. 1999).
135. Id. at 1113.
136. Id.
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reflect the same disagreements over the admissibility of hearsay and
oral statements under Rule 106 that are found in recent precedent.137
Commentators have continuously lamented the ambiguity inherent in
Rule 106’s partial codification of the doctrine of completeness.138 The
federal circuits have had forty-five years to coalesce around a uniform
and clear approach to Rule 106 and to completeness more broadly.
Instead, the circuit split has become calcified and shows no signs of
being resolved through a precedential consensus. Even in the Sixth
Circuit where a three-judge panel called for en banc reconsideration
of the prohibition on the admission of hearsay through Rule 106, no
action has been taken.139 The U.S. Supreme Court appears unlikely to
weigh in to correct the uncertainty surrounding Rule 106. The Court
has considered Rule 106 on only one occasion in Beech Aircraft Corp.
v. Rainey in 1988.140 Although the parties presented the Court with a
question arising under Rule 106, the Court declined to offer any interpretation of the Rule, instead resolving the issue on common law
grounds.141
An important animating principle behind the Federal Rules of Evidence is uniformity in the administration of justice throughout the
federal court system.142 And one of the most important functions of a
137. Compare United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that completing statement was properly admitted under Rule 106 over a hearsay
objection), and United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (concluding that Rule 106 admits otherwise inadmissible hearsay), with United States v. Sanjar,
876 F.3d 725, 739 (5th Cir. 2017) (“When offered by the government, a defendant’s
out-of-court statements are those of a party opponent and thus not hearsay. When offered by the defense, however, such statements are hearsay . . . .” (citation omitted)),
cert. denied sub nom. Main v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1577 (2018), and United States v.
Hayat, 710 F.3d 875, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Rule 106 ‘does not compel admission of
otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence.’” (quoting United States v. Collicott, 92 F.2d
973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996))).
138. See generally Nance, supra note 23; James P. Gillespie, Federal Rule of Evidence
106: A Proposal to Return to the Common Law Doctrine of Completeness, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 382 (1987) (exploring the possibility for expansion of Rule 106); Hardin, supra
note 41; Harold F. Baker, Completing the Rule of Completeness: Amending Rule 106 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 281 (2018) (highlighting circuit split
regarding Rule 106).
139. United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 2013).
140. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171–72 (1988) (declining to analyze the doctrine of completeness in Rule 106).
141. Id. at 175 (holding the District Court abused its discretion when Rainey’s
cross-examination was restricted); see 7 WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2100 at 626 (noting
that speech does not have to be believed); see also supra note 95 and accompanying
text (questioning the court’s illogical reluctance to admit remainders).
142. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary of the “Preliminary Study
of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal
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rules advisory committee is to monitor circuit splits and to propose
amendments to restore uniformity.143 The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules evaluated the possibility of amending Rule 106 in
2002.144 In the face of competing priorities145 and relying on the federal courts to manage the issue, the Advisory Committee exercised restraint and declined to propose an amendment to Rule 106.146 The
federal courts have had almost two additional decades to develop a
coherent blueprint for the operation of Rule 106, but the dysfunctional and disparate precedent persists.
Federal judges and litigants collectively expend considerable resources litigating the issues surrounding Rule 106 on a routine basis
and would benefit greatly from a clarifying amendment. In 2017, one
district court judge observed that completion issues are “recurring in
nature,” and that there is “a scarcity of helpful decisional authority” to
“guide courts and counsel” in resolving the “sometimes complicated
issues” raised by the doctrine of completeness.147 The court went on
to lament the uncertain and complex state of the law: “although there
is no shortage of case law and treatise analysis on this subject, the law
is far from settled, and courts and commentators have reached starkly
different results by applying a variety of approaches, resulting in an
Courts”: Mission Accomplished?, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1367, 1368–69 (2011) (discussing
the history of the development of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
143. Capra & Richter, supra note 61, at 1886–87 (emphasizing the importance of
rulemaking initiatives that resolve circuit splits); see also Edward Becker & Aviva
Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and
Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (1992) (emphasizing the importance of an Evidence Rules Advisory Committee to propose
amendments to resolve conflicts in the courts).
144. ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF APRIL 25, 2003,
at 9; see also United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 665 n.3 (D. Md. 2017) (“In
2002–03, the Advisory Committee considered whether to amend Rule 106 to extend
its scope to oral statements and acts, and whether to amend the rule to state that evidence that met the fairness requirement of Rule 106 was admissible even if it would
be inadmissible if offered on its own.”).
145. In 2003, many concerns and conflicts within the operation of the Federal
Rules presented more pressing priorities. Successful amendments have been adopted
to deal with these critical issues, moving the underinclusive nature of Rule 106 and its
conflicting and sometimes unfair application by the federal courts to the top of the list.
See Capra & Richter, supra note 61, at 1892 (describing amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence since the reconstitution of the Advisory Committee).
146. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 5071 (“The Committee voted unanimously
not to amend Rule 106 on the ground that the costs exceeded the benefits because ‘any
problems under the current rule were being well-handled by the courts.’” (quoting ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, supra note 144)).
147. United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 663 (D. Md. 2017).

2020]

EVIDENTIARY IRONY

931

evidentiary landscape that is unclear.”148 Other federal judges have
commented on the frequency with which issues of completeness arise
in the heat of criminal trials, thus depriving judges and litigants of the
time for study and reflection afforded by motions in limine.149 Although they arise with great frequency in criminal cases, completeness
concerns come up in civil litigation as well.150 In all of these cases, trial
judges require clear rule text that resolves the most commonly occurring completeness issues.151
Notably, several states have adopted evidence rules governing
completion that deviate from Rule 106 and offer more clarity to judges
and litigants.152 Although the Federal Rules of Evidence were designed
as a model for the states to utilize in developing evidence doctrine,
completion represents an area in which the federal system could benefit from the experience of the state courts.153
In sum, it is clear that Rule 106 is a workhorse evidence provision
that is in need of remodeling.154 To construct a more complete and
148. Id.
149. See ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF OCTOBER
25, 2019, at 9 (commenting on the frequency with which completion issues arise during trial).
150. See, e.g., Phoenix Assocs. III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding
the accountant’s work papers were necessary to complete presentation of financial
statements because the financial statements on their own were misleading); Brewer v.
Jeep Corp., 724 F.2d 653, 657 (8th Cir. 1983) (“The appellant was free to introduce the
film containing the jeep rollovers but only upon the condition that the written study
explaining these graphic scenes also be offered. The trial court’s order required only
that the complete report be admitted, the mundane as well as the sensational. In this
the trial court was fair and its exercise of discretion was not an abuse.”).
151. See Imwinkelried, supra note 142, at 1368–69 (discussing importance of having a set of rules lawyers can carry into court to resolve quickly common evidence issues).
152. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 356 (Deering 2020); CONN. CODE EVID (2018). Sec. 1-5;
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-822 (2020); IOWA R. EVID. 5.106 (2016); MONT. R. EVID. 106
(2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-106 (2020); N.H. R. EVID. 106 (2016); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40.040 (2019); TEX. R. EVID. 106–07 (2020); WIS. STAT. § 901.07 (2019).
153. Symposium, Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, Evidence
Section Program: The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 765
(2002) (noting the comments of Professor Christopher B. Mueller encouraging the federal Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules to attend to the insights offered by state
evidence rules).
154. Of course, Congress retains concurrent authority to enact rules of practice and
procedure and could, in theory, step in to regulate completion. But this potential for a
fix is both unlikely and ill-advised. See Capra & Richter, supra note 61, at 1904 (explaining that Congress rarely enacts evidence provisions independently and that direct enactment by Congress is inferior to the rulemaking process). One might also argue that
unfairness resulting from a criminal defendant’s inability to rebut a misleading presentation with completing hearsay could be rectified by the Constitution. But federal
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functional rule of completeness, however, rule-makers must determine the optimal approach to otherwise inadmissible hearsay and to
oral completing statements.
A. ADDRESSING THE HEARSAY ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
Rule 106 should be amended to resolve, once and for all, the dilemma of otherwise inadmissible hearsay needed to correct an unfair
and incomplete presentation of a statement. The decision of Rule
106’s original drafters to maintain silence on this critical issue has
generated much of the confusion surrounding the Rule. An amendment that allows a party to complete with otherwise inadmissible
hearsay when the fairness standard is satisfied¾and to rely upon the
completing statement for its truth¾is most consistent with the intent
behind the original Rule and with the purpose of the Evidence Rules
more broadly.155
1. Otherwise Inadmissible Hearsay: To Admit or Not To Admit, That
Is the (First) Question
An amendment to Rule 106 should specifically provide that a
statement, necessary to complete a statement presented in a misleading manner, is admissible despite the fact that it is hearsay. That solution to the hearsay problem is the only one that is consistent with the
fundamental purpose of the completeness doctrine and with the intent of the original drafters of Rule 106.
Allowing a hearsay objection to defeat completion authorized under Rule 106’s narrow fairness standard permits a misleading presentation of evidence to go unrebutted and leaves the fact-finder with a
distorted view of the evidence. The Adams opinion from the Sixth Circuit illustrates the deleterious impact of the exclusion alternative. In
that case, the court recognized that the prosecution’s selective presentation of the defendant’s statements left jurors with the impression
that the defendant admitted unlawfully hand-picking corrupt people
courts have denied constitutional challenges based upon the admission of a defendant’s inculpatory statements without completing evidence of exculpatory statements.
See Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 316 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Beyond explicit rules such as
the privilege against self-incrimination and the confrontation clause, none of which
applies here, the Constitution has little to say about rules of evidence. The hearsay rule
and its exception for admissions of a party opponent are venerable doctrines; no serious constitutional challenge can be raised to them.” (citation omitted)). And, of course,
the constitutional right to an effective defense has no applicability where the unfair
portion is offered by the criminal defendant, or by a party in a civil case. In those situations, the remedy against unfairness must come from the Evidence Rules or not at all.
155. FED. R. EVID. 102.
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to serve on an election board when he had instead denied doing any
such thing.156 Nonetheless, the court upheld the trial court’s exclusion
of the defendant’s completing statements based upon controlling
Sixth Circuit precedent preventing the presentation of the defendant’s
otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements through Rule 106.157
Therefore, the defendant’s conviction was based, in part, on a misleading presentation of his own statements.
An interpretation of Rule 106 that permits a selective and misleading presentation of a statement to go unrebutted is a clear perversion of its fundamental promise of “fairness.”158 Indeed, such an interpretation defies the fundamental purpose of the Rules in their
entirety. Federal Rule of Evidence 102 makes clear that the Rules are
to be construed “to administer every proceeding fairly” and “to the
end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”159
Amending Rule 106 in a manner that allows litigants to present evidence unfairly and out of context cannot be squared with Rule 102’s
clear mandate.
a. Legislative History Supports the Admission of Hearsay
The legislative history of Rule 106 supports its use as a tool for
overcoming a hearsay objection. As discussed above, the DOJ fought
for an express limitation on Rule 106 that would prevent completion
with hearsay before the Advisory Committee and Congress.160 Both
rejected the DOJ’s call to exclude completing statements that would be
otherwise inadmissible.161 Although it is theoretically possible that
Congress rejected this limitation because it thought proposed Rule
106 already prevented the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence, noted commentators have characterized this possibility as “unlikely” because:
One would suppose that if the [Judiciary] Committee¾[within which] the
Justice Department did not want for friends¾thought that all it would take
to make the Department happy was to make the Rule say what the Senators
intended it should mean, then the Department’s proposed amendment would

156. United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 826–27 (6th Cir. 2013).
157. Id. at 827.
158. FED. R. EVID. 106; see also United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 675 (D.
Md. 2017) (“One can hardly claim the moral high ground through a willingness to accept an unfair result in the name of evidentiary purity.”).
159. FED. R. EVID. 102.
160. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21.
161. Id.
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have been adopted or some statement of Congressional intent placed in the
Committee Report.162

This legislative history demonstrates that completion was never
intended to be foreclosed by a hearsay objection.
And this makes eminent sense. Requiring completing evidence to
be “otherwise admissible” would reduce the doctrine of completion to
a timing advantage beneficial only to litigants already capable of selfhelp.163 Parties possessing the independent evidentiary authority to
admit certain out-of-court statements would be able to present them
earlier in the case. The litigants who need protection from a distorted
presentation of the evidence the most¾those who cannot independently admit the completing evidence¾would remain exposed to
selective and unfair presentations. Excluding completing statements
that are not “otherwise admissible” makes the completion right a dead
letter in any circumstance where the parties possess asymmetrical
rights to admit an out-of-court statement under existing hearsay
rules. Completion concerns most commonly arise in those circumstances where the risk of abuse is most serious: when the government
seeks to present a criminal defendant’s incriminating statements
without including exculpatory portions.164 Due to the one-way admissibility of party-opponent statements under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(A), there is always an asymmetrical right in favor of the
162. See id. § 5078.1, at n.32.
163. In his influential work on the rule of completion, Professor Dale Nance also
argued that completion must have been intended to trump exclusionary rules because
rebuttal or optional completion during an opponent’s case in chief was routinely recognized as a distinct doctrine. According to Professor Nance, if completion did not
trump exclusionary rules, there would be no purpose for recognizing completion as a
distinct doctrine in the rebuttal context because the basic rules of relevance would authorize admission of an otherwise admissible omitted remainder during an opponent’s
case in chief without the need for any special doctrine. The only reason to recognize a
special doctrine to allow this rebuttal completion is to overcome exclusionary rules
that could otherwise block the admissibility of this relevant evidence. Dale A. Nance,
Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 51 (1996).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 314 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Rule 106
does not render admissible evidence that is otherwise inadmissible.”); United States v.
Coplan, 703 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 134–35 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding defendant’s web
postings were not admissible under Rule 106 because they were hearsay); United
States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Oloyede, 933 F.3d 302
(4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867,
876–77 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Hayat, 710 F.3d 875, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Rule
106 ‘does not compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence.’” (quoting United States v. Collicott, 92 F.2d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996))).
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government in such cases.165 A defendant may not admit his own outof-court statements under that exception.166 Therefore, if a completing statement must be “otherwise admissible,” completion will almost
always be unavailable when the prosecution unfairly distorts a defendant’s own statements.167
b. Placement of the Rule
It might be argued that the placement of Rule 106 in Article 1 of
the Evidence Rules indicates that the drafters did not consider it to
operate as a hearsay exception—if they had, the argument goes, they
would have placed it with the hearsay rule and its exceptions in Article
8. But this argument is easily dismissed. Rule 802, which is the operative rule against hearsay,168 provides that hearsay is inadmissible “unless any of the following provides otherwise:
● a federal statute;
● these rules; or
● other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”169
The reference is to these rules, meaning all of the Evidence Rules.
If the drafters had wanted to limit hearsay exceptions to those in Article 8, Rule 802 would have referred to “the rules in this article” rather
than “these rules.” Notably, courts have found rules outside of Article
165. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
166. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, 4 FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801.02 (2020) (“The touchstone of admissibility is that
the statement is beneficial to, and offered by, the speaker’s opponent at the time of
trial. It follows that a party can never admit a statement in her favor under [Rule
801(d)(2)]; the statement must be offered by a party-opponent.”).
167. Such asymmetry is not limited to party opponent statements that favor the
government in criminal cases. Similar issues can arise when a defendant offers a partial statement against the government under the former testimony or declarations
against interest exceptions and a completing remainder is not independently admissible against the defendant under those exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Woolbright,
831 F.2d 1390, 1395–97 (8th Cir. 1987) (determining that a woman’s statement that a
bag where drugs were found was hers was admissible against government under the
declarations against interest exception, but the woman’s statement that she and the
defendant were “on their honeymoon” was not); State v. Selalla, 744 N.W.2d 802, 818
(S.D. 2008); United States v. Maccini, 721 F.2d 840, 845 (1st Cir. 1983) (permitting a
prosecutor to have additional portions of a witness’s grand jury testimony read after
defense counsel introduced a misleading portion of that testimony); United States v.
Mosquera, 886 F.3d 1032, 1049 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming the district court’s application of Rule 106 to allow the government to admit additional portions of a witness
interview after the defendant selectively admitted portions of the interview).
168. Rule 801 defines hearsay; Rule 802 is the source of exclusion of hearsay. FED.
R. EVID. 802 (“The Rule Against Hearsay”).
169. Id. (emphasis added).
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8, including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(4), to be grounds
for admitting hearsay.170 If a hearsay exception can be found outside
the Evidence Rules, there is no reason why an exception cannot be
found within those rules but outside of Article 8.
Moreover, as stated by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Sutton,171 the placement of Rule 106 is actually a point in favor of finding
a hearsay exception. While other evidentiary provisions qualify admissibility by reference to other rules, Rule 106 contains no proviso
that it applies “except as otherwise provided by these rules.”172 Therefore, the fundamental fairness purpose of Rule 106 and a clear-eyed
reading of its legislative history demonstrate that Rule 106 should
permit otherwise inadmissible completing statements to be admitted
for their truth.
c.

Subsequent Correction as an Alternative to Completion

Notwithstanding the compelling reasons to admit the otherwise
inadmissible when necessary for completeness, some courts have suggested that Rule 106 need not operate as a vehicle for admitting otherwise inadmissible hearsay due to an adversary’s ability to correct
the record later in the trial.173 With respect to the completing, exculpatory hearsay statements of criminal defendants, for example, courts
have suggested that defendants may offer statements excluded during
the prosecution’s case by taking the stand during the defense case and
relating their own completing exculpatory statements.174 Under this
170. See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(B). Civil Rule 32(a)(4)(B) allows admission of hearsay from a deposition even though the declarant is not unavailable under the terms of
the Evidence Rules. In effect the Civil Rule creates an independent hearsay exception.
And courts have upheld that exception, referring to Rule 802’s list of sources for an
exception outside of Article 8. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Tomlinson, 895 F.3d 1010, 1020 (8th
Cir. 2018). The Fletcher court noted that Rule 32 authorizes admissibility of deposition
hearsay even though it is not admissible under the Article 8 exceptions, as well as that
“[d]ecisions from around the country have concluded that Rule 32(a)(4)(B) operates
as an independent exception to the hearsay rule.” Id.
171. United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
172. Compare FED. R. EVID. 106, with FED. R. EVID. 402, and FED. R. EVID. 501.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725, 739 (5th Cir. 2017) (“When offered by the government, a defendant’s out-of-court statements are those of a party
opponent and thus not hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). When offered by the defense,
however, such statements are hearsay (the defendant may, of course, reiterate the outof-court statements on the stand if he chooses to testify).”), cert. denied sub nom. Main
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1577 (2018).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Holifield, No. 05-920, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147815,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2010) (“The court Orders that Defendant Jordan may not introduce any exculpatory statements, not previously introduced by the Government, that
constitute inadmissible hearsay” and that if the defendant wants to admit such
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view, a defendant could correct the record by taking the stand and
subjecting himself to cross-examination, rendering admission
through Rule 106 unnecessary.
This “testimony” remedy for a misleading presentation by the
prosecution in a criminal case is flawed for many reasons. First, the
entire premise of Rule 106 is that contemporaneous completion is
crucial because repair work may be inadequate “when delayed to a
point later in the trial.”175 By the time a defendant has the opportunity
to take the stand and rebut a distorted presentation of his own statement, the jury’s misapprehension of the evidence may be intractable.
Furthermore, a defendant’s testimony is automatically impeached by
bias when he takes the stand in his own defense.176 A jury may justifiably suspect a defendant’s own delayed testimony that he made selfserving statements along with the inculpatory statements selectively
presented by the prosecution, thus allowing the prosecution to retain
the benefit of the misleading presentation. The defendant’s testimony
pales in comparison to requiring a government witness to recount the
defendant’s completing exculpatory statements, made at or near the
time of the statement already introduced.
In addition, the testimony alternative comes with a prohibitive
cost: the defendant must sacrifice his Fifth Amendment right to refuse
to testify and subject himself to cross-examination¾including impeachment with prior convictions¾just to correct a misleading impression purposely created by the government.177 Finally, and
statements “he must do so by taking the stand and testifying himself” because “Federal
Rule of Evidence 106 does not influence the admissibility of such hearsay statements.”).
175. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note.
176. See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the
Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
289, 299 (2008) (“Jurors . . . are well aware that even otherwise honest defendants
have a strong incentive to shade their trial testimony in favor of acquittal.”).
177. See United States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he situation at hand does bear similarity to ‘[f]orcing the defendant to take the stand in order
to introduce the omitted exculpatory portions of [a] confession [which] is a denial of
his right against self-incrimination.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 1 WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 106[01], at 106.7 (1979))); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1370 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (“Since this was a criminal case Sucher had a constitutional right not to testify, and it was thus necessary for Sucher to rebut the government’s inference with the
excluded portions of these recordings.”); see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 106-09
(“[T]he defendant’s right against self-incrimination may be jeopardized if he is required to take the stand in order to introduce the omitted exculpatory portions of the
confession.”); Baker, supra note 138, at 304 (“Is it not the case that allowing the jury to
hear misleading evidence—that cannot be completed without the defendant testifying—creates ‘overwhelming pressure’ [on the defendant to testify]?”).
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perhaps most ironically, the very hearsay objection that prevented the
defendant from inquiring about his own completing statement during
the government’s initial presentation should still operate to prevent
the defendant from recounting the statement himself during his direct
examination.178 If it is hearsay when offered to complete during the
prosecution’s case, that same out-of-court statement is hearsay when
the defendant wishes to testify to it later in the trial.179
d. The Floodgates Argument
Others may argue that Rule 106 should not provide a basis for
admitting the otherwise inadmissible due to the risk that it will become a gateway for a deluge of inadmissible evidence.180 But admitting hearsay under Rule 106 will not open the floodgates to allow the
unrestricted flow of previously inadmissible hearsay evidence into
the trial process. Rule 106 contains important threshold requirements
that operate as substantial limits on the consequences of any amendment. As explored above, Rule 106 authorizes completion of statements only when “fairness” requires it.181 Although they are divided
with respect to all other completeness concerns, the federal courts
have uniformly interpreted this fairness standard narrowly to permit
completion only when the original partial presentation of a statement
is misleading and creates a distorted impression of the statement that
was made.182 As one federal judge recently framed the issue, “proper
application of the ‘fairness’ requirement” will prevent any abuse of
Rule 106 “because judges should restrict application of Rule 106 to
those situations where misleading information actually was introduced . . . and allow only such correcting evidence as is necessary to
counteract it.”183 Therefore, fear that Rule 106 will permit the free
flow of a large volume of inadmissible evidence into the trial process
is misplaced and overblown.

178. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that . . . the declarant
does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing . . . .”).
179. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 5072, at 386 (“[T]he first problem with the
adversary solution is that the prosecution may be able to prevent the defendant from
offering the rest of his confession by objecting that it is hearsay; a party’s own out-ofcourt statement only comes in as an admission when it is offered by an adversary.”).
180. See supra note 60.
181. FED. R. EVID. 106.
182. See supra note 65.
183. United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 668 (D. Md. 2017).
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The Forfeiture Analysis

Admitting an otherwise inadmissible remainder for its truth represents no injustice to the proponent who admitted the partial statement. By using the right that it enjoys under the Rules¾not as a shield
to prevent the admission of potentially unreliable evidence, but as a
sword to manufacture a misleading impression of the evidence¾the
proponent should forfeit the right to object to a completing remainder.
It is hardly radical to conclude that a misleading presentation forfeits the right to object to otherwise inadmissible evidence needed to
correct the misimpression. In People v. Vines, the California Supreme
Court held that the rule of completeness extinguishes a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.184 In Vines, the defendant sought to admit part of a testimonial statement made to police
by his accomplice implicating a third party in the robbery at issue. The
trial court held that the prosecution would be permitted to admit the
remainder of the accomplice’s testimonial statement in which he implicated the defendant in the shooting that occurred during the robbery to dispel the improper inference that the accomplice had placed
full responsibility on the third party.185 The California Supreme Court
affirmed:
[L]ike forfeiture by wrongdoing, [California’s rule of completeness] is not an
exception to the hearsay rule that purports to assess the reliability of testimony. The statute is founded on the equitable notion that a party who elects
to introduce a part of a conversation is precluded from objecting on confrontation clause grounds to introduction by the opposing party of other parts of
the conversation which are necessary to make the entirety of the conversation understood . . . . As Crawford forbids only the admissibility of evidence
under statutes purporting to substitute another method for [the] confrontation clause test of reliability, evidence admissible under section 356 does not
offend Crawford.186

184. People v. Vines, 251 P.3d 943, 968–69 (Cal. 2011), modified Aug. 10, 2011,
overruled by People v. Hardy, 418 P.3d 309 (Cal. 2018) (overruling based on other
grounds); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36 (2004) (prohibiting admission of “testimonial” hearsay statements against a criminal defendant pursuant to the
Sixth Amendment confrontation clause unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant).
185. Vines, 251 P.3d at 968 (“Defendant wanted to rely on a part of Proby’s statement to imply that Blackie was the shooter, which was contrary to what Proby actually
said elsewhere in his statement.”).
186. Id. at 968–69 (quoting People v. Parrish, 152 Cal. App. 4th 263, 272–73
(2007)) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)); see also People v. Reid,
971 N.E.2d 353, 357 (N.Y. 2012) (“If evidence barred under the Confrontation Clause
were inadmissible irrespective of a defendant’s actions at trial, then a defendant could
attempt to delude a jury ‘by selectively revealing only those details of a testimonial
statement that are potentially helpful to the defense’ . . . . To avoid such unfairness and
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Federal courts have similarly found a defendant’s confrontation
rights forfeited due to a misleading partial presentation of testimonial
statements by the defense.187
If a criminal defendant may lose his constitutional right to confront his accusers through a misleading partial presentation of a testimonial hearsay statement, the government should also forfeit a mere
hearsay objection to a completing remainder when it selectively and
unfairly introduces a criminal defendant’s statement.
Outside of Rule 106, the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically
contemplate a party’s forfeiture of an objection due to the misleading
presentation or disclosure of certain evidence. Rule 502(a) codifies
the doctrine of subject matter waiver of privilege that can cause a privilege-holder to lose the protection of privilege with respect to all material on the same subject as previously disclosed material.188 Rule
502(a) provides that a waiver of privilege extends to additional undisclosed matter when the original waiver was “intentional,” when the
disclosed and undisclosed information concern the “same subject
matter,” and when “they ought in fairness to be considered together.”189 The “fairness” standard in Rule 502(a) was modeled after
Rule 106 and was intended to require an onerous subject matter
waiver of privilege when a selective waiver of a portion of privileged
information creates a misleading or distorted view of the entirety of

to preserve the truth-seeking goals of our courts, we hold that the admission of testimony that violates the Confrontation Clause may be proper if the defendant opened
the door to its admission.” (quoting People v. Ko, 789 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 2005)));
People v. Parrish, 152 Cal. App. 4th 263, 272 (2007) (holding that the prosecution was
properly permitted to introduce other portions of an interview implicating defendant
to complete exculpatory portions admitted by defendant); State v. Selalla, 744 N.W.2d
802, 818 (S.D. 2008) (explaining that allowing a defendant to rely upon the confrontation clause to exclude completing testimonial statements offered by the prosecution
would “set up unfair outcomes arising out of not-so-hypothetical scenarios such as that
of the declarant who confesses to the police that he murdered two people, but then
subsequently, during the same interview, says that the defendant forced him to do it”).
187. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716 (10th Cir. 2010) (completing
testimonial hearsay was admissible; defendant forfeited his Sixth Amendment confrontation right by introducing portion of testimonial hearsay by confidential informant—a party who introduces a misleading portion opens the door to a fair completion);
Nguyen v. Macomber, No. 15-CV-00228, 2017 WL 2652874, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 19,
2017) (“The confrontation clause, however, does not preclude the prosecution from
introducing evidence that completes a statement previously introduced by the defendant.”).
188. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
189. Id.
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privileged information on the same subject.190 If a selective disclosure
of a single piece of privileged information can cost a litigant her attorney-client privilege with respect to all other privileged information on
the same subject, the selective and distorted presentation of part of a
hearsay statement should also cost the proponent her hearsay objection to the completing remainder.
f. The “Unreliable” Remainder and Completion as a “Hearsay
Exception”
Some might criticize this forfeiture approach as unfair to the original proponent of the partial statement by arguing that it transforms
Rule 106 into a free-standing hearsay exception capable of admitting
wholly unreliable hearsay.191 Even if it expressly permits the admission of completing hearsay for its truth, Rule 106 still will not operate
like traditional hearsay exceptions. As all acquainted with the Rules of
Evidence know, a lawyer may offer an out-of-court statement through
a traditional hearsay exception only by locating an exception with admissibility requirements that align with the statement. If a proffered
statement satisfies the requirements of a hearsay exception, the statement is admissible at the proponent’s election and no action by the
opponent is necessary to trigger or fulfill the exception.192 In sum, the
proponent of a hearsay statement typically possesses a unilateral
right to admit it through an applicable hearsay exception.193
By contrast, litigants will not possess any unilateral right to admit
otherwise inadmissible hearsay through Rule 106. Because the Rule
must be triggered by the selective and misleading presentation of a
statement, the proponent of that initial statement possesses exclusive
control over the admissibility of a completing remainder. If that proponent prefers to exclude the otherwise inadmissible completing
hearsay, she retains the unilateral authority to keep it out of evidence
190. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a) advisory committee’s note (“[T]hus, subject matter
waiver is limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner.”); see also Capra
& Richter, supra note 61, at 1914–15 (discussing adoption of Rule 502(a) and the borrowing of the fairness standard from Rule 106).
191. See United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982) (“The rule covers an order of proof problem; it is not designed to make something admissible that
should be excluded.”). But see Nance, supra note 23, at 866 (noting that the completeness doctrine allows an opponent to piggy-back on the inclusionary authority used by
the proponent in admitting the initial portion of the statement).
192. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (allowing any party to admit out-of-court statements for their truth if they relate to a startling event and were made while the declarant remained under the stress of excitement caused by the event).
193. Subject to objections on grounds other than hearsay of course.
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by modifying (or foregoing) her own presentation. Her adversary,
therefore, may not utilize Rule 106 to admit hearsay at her election,
but remains limited by the trial strategy of her opponent.194
It might also be argued that Rule 106 will foster unfairness in the
trial process if it allows “unreliable” completing remainders to be admitted for their truth. But this argument misses the point of completion as a palliative for a disingenuous presentation. In the typical case,
the original proponent of a partial statement presents that statement
for its truth. That is precisely what the government does in admitting
the inculpatory statements of a criminal defendant. But when the government presents such a statement in an incomplete and misleading
fashion, it peddles a half-truth to the fact-finder. The completing remainder must be admitted for its truth, not because it is itself reliable,
but because it is indispensable to a fact-finder searching for the whole
truth and nothing but the truth. Furthermore, the statements of a
criminal defendant are admissible against him pursuant to Rule
801(d)(2)(A) in the first place, not because they are reliable, but because adversarial fairness requires a person to answer for his own utterances.195 If the original party-opponent statement offered by the
government need not be reliable to be admitted for its truth, a statement necessary to offer an accurate representation of that statement
need not be either.
Allowing the admission of a completing remainder for its truth
does not mean that the original proponent¾usually the prosecution¾must accept the truth of the completing remainder.196 In the
194. One hearsay exception that does operate similarly is Rule 804(b)(6)—depriving an opponent of a hearsay objection if she acted wrongfully to create the unavailability of a declarant with the intent to prevent trial testimony. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
Prescribing a punishment that fits the crime, Rule 804(b)(6) allows all relevant hearsay statements made by such an unavailable declarant to be admitted against the
wrongdoer. Id. Rule 106 would provide a more limited, but proportional, remedy by
denying a hearsay objection to a party that proffers a misleading statement that can be
completed with hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (allowing the admission of
prior consistent statements for their truth only if the opponent impeaches the declarant in accordance with the exception).
195. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note (“Admissions by a
party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility as evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of
the conditions of the hearsay rule. No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the
case of an admission.” (citations omitted)).
196. See Johnson v. Powers, 40 Vt. 611, 612 (1868) (“It is therefore a rule of evidence that the whole declaration or admission of the party made at one time, shall be
taken together, but the jury are at liberty to believe a portion and disbelieve the other,
as they are of all evidence.”); see also 7 WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2100, at 626 (“[I]t is
a favorite cautionary addition that the exculpatory part need not be believed.”).
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example offered in the Introduction, should the defendant admit his
completing statement claiming to have sold the gun prior to the murder, the prosecution would remain free to argue the falsity of the defendant’s self-serving claim. Permitting a defendant to admit the completing remainder of his statement on the same footing as the
prosecution’s initial proffer simply means that the defendant may argue the truth of the completing statement (much as the prosecution
will argue the truth of his damaging admission). The prosecution remains free to challenge the truth of the completing remainder, arguing
that the defendant’s initial admission of culpability rings true, but that
the self-serving remainder should be rejected by the jury.197
***
For all of these reasons, an amendment to Rule 106 should reject
the exclusion of completing statements that satisfy the fairness standard simply because they are hearsay and should expressly permit
completion with statements that would otherwise be inadmissible.
2. The Truth of the Matter—the Context Alternative
Determining that Rule 106 should authorize completion with
otherwise inadmissible statements does not fully resolve the hearsay
issue that has plagued the federal courts for so long. Although most
federal courts have not squarely addressed the use to which completing statements may be put once admitted, a few courts and commentators have suggested that completing statements may sufficiently
serve their fairness purpose if they are admitted for their limited nonhearsay value in placing admitted statements in context.198 Under this
view, a completing statement could be admitted, but could not be relied upon for its truth. An amendment to Rule 106 that authorizes the
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay should also offer guidance about the use to which such statements may be put once they are
admitted. An optimal amendment to Rule 106 would go further than a
context-only approach and would truly level the playing field by admitting completing statements for the same purpose as the

197. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.108 commentary on a 1978 amendment (“This
amendment added a final sentence to Section 90.108 to make clear that a party, who
is required to introduce writings or recorded statements under the section, will not be
bound by the evidence so introduced.”).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 60 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[W]hen the
omitted portion of a statement is properly introduced to correct a misleading impression or place in context that portion already admitted, it is for this very reason admissible for a valid, nonhearsay purpose: to explain and ensure the fair understanding of
the evidence that has already been introduced.”).

944

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:901

statements they complete, even if that means admitting otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements for their truth.199
a. Admitting Completing Statements for Their Truth Is Consistent
with the Underlying Purpose and Original Intent of Rule 106
Admitting completing statements on the same basis and for the
same purpose as the partially admitted statements they complete is
most consistent with the underlying fairness rationale for Rule 106. A
litigant creates her adversary’s right to complete by selectively presenting a portion of a statement in a manner that misleads the jury as
to its true import.200 Only by permitting the completing party to rely
upon the admitted remainder to the same extent as the initial misleading portion is fairness restored. Limiting the completing statement to
its non-hearsay value in demonstrating “context” leaves the party who
presented the partial statement in a distorted fashion with a trial advantage. The proponent who manipulated the evidence unfairly may
argue the “truth” of the distorted partial statement, while the wronged
adversary is left with the weak and confusing response that the jury
should consider the completing portion of the statement, not as proof
of a fact, but only to place the initial assertions of “fact” in context. This
allows the proponent who misleadingly presented evidence to retain
the benefit of the distorted statement. A rule that is premised upon
fairness in presentation cannot countenance such a fairness halfmeasure.
There is strong evidence that Rule 106 was intended by the drafters to allow completing statements to be presented for their truth. Although Dean Wigmore argued in favor of limited non-hearsay use of
completing statements, the majority of courts at common law disagreed with him and allowed completing statements to be admitted for
their truth.201 In the face of this common law history, the drafters of
199. There is an argument to be made that Rule 106 should overcome objections
other than hearsay to properly completing evidence. See Nance, supra note 23, at 879–
80 (“[T]he trumping function is important in any context where the exclusionary rules
are asymmetric, that is, where the rules make certain evidence admissible if offered by
one party, but inadmissible if offered by an opponent.”). This Article focuses on the
hearsay problem because the hearsay prohibition is commonly used to thwart completion; no other exclusionary rule has been raised in the reported cases on Rule 106.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1475 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Once
relevance has been established, the trial court then must address the second half of the
test, and should do so by asking (1) does it explain the admitted evidence, (2) does it
place the admitted evidence in context, (3) will admitting it avoid misleading the trier
of fact, and (4) will admitting it insure a fair and impartial understanding of all the
evidence.”).
201. See supra note 42.
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Rule 106 maintained textual silence on the hearsay issue while citing
in Committee notes to the California completeness provision, which
allows hearsay to be admitted for its truth when necessary to complete.202 Had the drafters intended to alter the majority approach to
completing hearsay and to limit the use to which completing statements could be put, they would have done so explicitly.
In Tome v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning with respect to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) governing prior consistent
statements. In that case, the Court found a pre-Rules common law timing limitation on the admissibility of prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate impeached testifying witnesses.203 The Court
found that a majority of courts required a prior consistent statement
to have been made before any motive to fabricate with which the witness was charged at trial. Where the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
were silent with respect to any timing requirement, the Court found
the common law pre-motive limitation baked into the Rule.204 Applying the same reasoning to Rule 106 suggests that the drafters expected
the common law majority approach that permitted completing hearsay to be offered for its truth to continue under the Rule.
b. A “Context” Only Approach: Wasteful Complexity and Needless
Disruption
The alternative of admitting a completing statement for its nonhearsay value in showing context only is suboptimal for several reasons. Limiting the use of completing statements would require them
to be accompanied by limiting instructions cautioning the jury against
full use of the evidence. Limiting instructions are notoriously confusing for jurors to comprehend and follow.205 Requiring completing remainders to be accompanied by limiting instructions in every case will
lead to confusion at least and fairness defeating rejection of the remainder at worst.
The difficulty the jury will likely encounter with a “context” solution can be illustrated with the hypothetical in which the defendant
202. See FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 356
(Deering 2020)); see also Rosenberg v. Wittenborn, 3 Cal. Rptr. 459, 464 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960) (explaining that qualifying statements as hearsay provides no basis for excluding them under the California completeness rule).
203. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 161–63 (1995).
204. Id.
205. David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 407, 447 (2013) (“[I]f we cannot come up with an explanation for the [limiting]
instruction that will make sense to jurors . . . it may be a good time to reexamine the
rule that the instruction attempts to implement.”).
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stated: “I bought the gun, but I sold it two months before the murder.”206 In that circumstance, the government could present the portion of the statement that admits “I bought the gun” and could argue
that the defendant’s possession of the gun before the murder has been
proved by his own statement. Based on that presentation alone, the
jury could reasonably infer that, because the defendant bought the
gun, he still had it at the time of the crime. Even if he is thereafter permitted to offer the remainder of his statement about selling the gun,
the defendant would not be able to argue that the evidence indicates
that he no longer had the gun. A limiting instruction would alert the
jury that it could consider the defendant’s completing statement about
the sale of the gun only for “context.” To properly adhere to that instruction, a jury should simply decline to draw the inference it would
otherwise have drawn from the government’s partial and misleading
presentation. The jury should not assume the defendant had the gun
at the time of the murder because the completing statement eliminates that inference. And the jury may not assume that the defendant
sold the gun before the murder if the completing statement is not admissible for its truth. Accordingly, after hearing both portions of the
statement, the jury should assume that the statement provides no evidence one way or the other about the defendant’s possession of the
gun at the time of the crime. It is highly doubtful that a lay jury will
perform the mental gymnastics required for this completion “solution.”
Instead, it appears likely that jurors will give effect to the portion
of the statement misleadingly presented by the prosecution because
the government can and will argue the truth of that statement. Jurors
may interpret a perplexing instruction to limit their use of the defendant’s completing statement to “context” as code, cautioning them to
disbelieve it. Befuddled by the limiting instruction, jurors may simply
ignore the completing portion altogether. Such a jury would be left
with the inference that the defendant had the gun at the time of the
murder. Thus, a defendant who may not argue the truth of his contemporaneous completing statement may lose any benefit from Rule
106.207
206. United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 664 (D. Md. 2017) (describing
this scenario).
207. JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENT’S TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 322 (1935)
(acknowledging that the nonhearsay theory rests on a distinction that is “an artificial
doctrine tending to a quibble”); see also Nance, supra note 23, at 874 (“While the remainder becomes admissible only by virtue of the proponent’s presentation of the incomplete part, the net effect of the whole ought not to be limited in a way that it would
not have been if offered by the proponent in the first instance. Thus, the use of the
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Furthermore, amendments to the Evidence Rules should not add
unnecessary complexity to the trial process. A context-only approach
to completing statements is contrary to the recent trend in evidence
rulemaking, which evinces an intent to eliminate perplexing and needless limiting instructions. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(B) was amended in 2014 to make certain prior consistent
statements¾previously admissible only for the limited purpose of rehabilitating an impeached witness¾admissible for their truth.208 One
of the principal benefits of this amendment was to eliminate the need
for confusing limiting instructions cautioning jurors to utilize an admitted prior consistent statement only for its non-hearsay rehabilitative purpose.209 An amendment to Rule 106 should not run counter to
this objective by requiring an incomprehensible limiting instruction
not currently given in the completion context.210
The fact that limiting instructions are not an existing feature of
federal completion doctrine reveals another defect with a “context
only” amendment to Rule 106. Such an amendment would anoint a
distinctly minority view of completion as the uniform federal rule. The
majority of federal courts admit completing statements that would
otherwise be hearsay under the current version of Rule 106 without
limiting the use to which they may be put.211 Other federal courts exclude such statements altogether.212 Only one circuit has expressly
provided that completing statements should be admitted for their
“non-hearsay” value and even then only in dicta.213 Amending Rule
106 to limit completing statements to their non-hearsay value in all
remainder is not rightly limited to nullifying the effect of the incomplete part. The net
probative effect of the whole utterance may favor the opponent.”).
208. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to the 2014 amendment.
209. See Liesa L. Richter, Seeking Consistency for Prior Consistent Statements:
Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 46 CONN. L. REV. 937, 942 (2014) (describing the goal of the amendment “to eliminate the disparate treatment of similarlysituated prior consistent statements at trial, as well as the need for confusing limiting
instructions that may befuddle a lay jury”).
210. See BLINKA, supra note 1, § 107.2 (“The better practice . . . is to introduce the
remaining parts on the same footing as those originally offered. Simply put, the additional evidence ‘which ought in fairness to be considered’ is also admissible under the
rule of completeness. Juries, like all people (even lawyers), are ill-equipped to draw
tortured distinctions between statements offered for their ‘truth’ and those admitted
solely to provide ‘context.’ . . . [T]he trial judge should admit only those statements
‘which are necessary to provide context and prevent distortion.’ This standard suffices
without resort to a meaningless limiting instruction.”).
211. See supra notes 69–83 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text.
213. United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 64 (2d Cir. 2019).
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instances would significantly disrupt the settled operation of Rule 106
in almost all federal circuits. The optimal resolution of a circuit split is
typically found in the majority approach to a contested provision, both
because a majority of the federal judges that have considered the issue
have favored one approach and because a majority resolution causes
the least disruption to existing practice.214 To adopt a limited contextonly amendment to Rule 106 would be to enshrine an untested minority view in rule text.
The most sensible amendment to Rule 106 would permit a completing statement to be used for the same purpose as the original partially presented statement. Most commonly, the original statement is
presented for its truth under a hearsay exception.215 If, however, the
original partial statement was offered only for its non-hearsay
value¾perhaps in showing the effect of the statement on some party
to the litigation who heard the statement¾then limiting the completing statement to the same non-hearsay use would be both fair and
workable.216 It would be fair because it would maintain a level playing
field for both parties who would both be limited to the non-hearsay
purpose. Because the original statement would force the jury to comprehend the limited purpose of the statement in creating some effect
on the party, a similar limitation on the completing portion of the
statement would not add confusion or complexity. In these narrow
circumstances, a non-hearsay limitation on a completing remainder
would be appropriate and would be required even by an amendment
authorizing use of a completing statement on the same basis as the
original statement. But an amendment to Rule 106 should not extend
a non-hearsay limit to all completing statements.
Finally, an amendment to Rule 106 providing that completing
statements may be admitted for their non-hearsay value would be an
ineffectual exercise of rulemaking authority. Rule 802 of the Federal
Rules excludes hearsay evidence, but Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as
214. See Capra & Richter, supra note 61, at 1891 (explaining that a “drafter should
ordinarily give greater weight to the majority rule on an issue”).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725, 739 (5th Cir. 2017) (“When offered by the government, a defendant’s out-of-court statements are those of a party
opponent and thus not hearsay.”), cert. denied sub nom. Main v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
1577 (2018).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Sweiss, 800 F.2d 684, 690–91 (7th Cir. 1986) (permitting the defense to offer a recording of a prior conversation between the defendant
and an informant showing that the informant told the defendant about the charged plot
after the government admitted a recording of a conversation between the defendant
and the same informant suggesting that the defendant knew in advance of the conversation about the plot ).
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an out-of-court statement that “a party offers in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”217 Accordingly, a completing statement that is offered only for its non-hearsay value in
showing context for the previously admitted partial statement is not
hearsay under current rules and is thus, already admissible under existing Rule 106. No amendment to the Rules is necessary to make outof-court statements admissible when they are not offered for their
truth. An amendment that does nothing more than echo the operation
of existing rules would not represent effective rulemaking.
***
Therefore, an ideal amendment to Rule 106 would resolve the
longstanding circuit split with respect to otherwise inadmissible hearsay in favor of admissibility. Further, to fulfill the fairness goals of Rule
106 and the Federal Rules of Evidence more broadly, an amendment
should allow the admission of such completing statements for the
same purpose as the statements they complete. If the partial statement was introduced for its truth, the completing statement necessary
to prevent distortion of the evidence should also be admissible for its
truth.
B. BRINGING ORAL STATEMENTS UNDER THE TENT
Any amendment to Rule 106 should also address the longstanding conflict with respect to incomplete oral statements. Because Rule
106 applies by its terms only to written and recorded statements, it
offers no remedy for partially presented oral statements. But selectively presented oral statements raise the same fairness concerns that
partial written and recorded statements do.218 Courts have been left
to the common law of evidence and to the nebulous authority of the
trial judge to control the “mode and order of examining witnesses and
presenting evidence” under Rule 611 to address completeness concerns surrounding oral statements. Most troubling are the courts that
have denied completeness protection to oral statements entirely because of their omission from Rule 106. Amending Rule 106 to resolve
the hearsay question affords rule-makers an opportunity to craft a
more concise and accessible approach to oral statements as well.

217. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
218. WEINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 106-15 (“Both considerations normally are particularly important, when words, whether written or oral, are the object of proof.”); see
also United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 664 (D. Md. 2017) (“A blanket rule of
prohibition [on the completion of oral statements] is unwarranted, and invites
abuse.”).
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1. Leaving Well Enough Alone?
In contrast to the drafting history of Rule 106 with respect to the
hearsay issue, the legislative history clearly reflects the original drafters’ decision to omit oral statements from the Rule. In light of that unequivocal intention to exclude oral statements from the protection of
Rule 106 and to codify completion only partially, a case could be made
for leaving oral statements out of any amendment to the Rule. An
amended provision could address the most troubling hearsay question and allow courts to continue relying upon Rule 611(a) and the
common law to resolve completeness concerns attending the partial
presentation of oral statements.
But there are several drawbacks to the current state of affairs for
incomplete oral statements. Leaving the completion right for such
statements out in the ether of the common law or in the penumbra of
Rule 611(a) creates a trap for the unwary litigator. The Federal Rules
of Evidence were designed as a concise set of standards that lawyers
could carry into court and consult in the heat of trial to resolve evidentiary questions as they arise.219 Unlike issues such as the admissibility of expert opinion testimony under Rule 702 or other acts evidence under Rule 404(b) that are commonly argued in limine,
completion issues frequently arise during trial in response to the evidentiary presentation of an adversary. In such a setting, trial judges
and lawyers alike need to be able to consult the rulebook to determine
whether completion is authorized.
Without any completion protection applicable to oral statements
expressly defined in the Evidence Rules, lawyers—and even judges—
may not think to consider the remaining common law of evidence. As
the Reporter for the Advisory Committee which drafted the original
Rules noted:
In principle, under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains.
“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided . . . .” In reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist,
though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise
of delegated powers.220

Lawyers may be even less likely to consider the possibility of a
completion right lingering outside the Evidence Rules in the common
law because the Rules contain Rule 106, a provision that codifies a
completion right for written and recorded statements. In other areas
where the common law has been found to persist—such as in the
219. Imwinkelried, supra note 142, at 1368–69.
220. Edward Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L.
REV. 908, 915 (1978).
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regulation of impeachment for bias—the Rules are silent.221 In contrast, the “partial” codification of completion in Rule 106 may ambush
lawyers who take the Rule’s exclusion of oral statements at face value
when arguing for completion on the fly in the heat of trial without the
opportunity for research or in-depth review of Advisory Committee
notes.
Even with the opportunity for study and reflection, courts may be
reluctant to embrace a common law solution in the face of an evidence
rule on point. In the recent case of United States v. Oloyede,222 for example, the defendant specifically relied on the common law rule of
completeness to argue that an exculpatory portion of his oral statement should have been admitted. Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s recognition of common law completion rights in Beech Aircraft, the Fourth Circuit expressed “doubt that a common law rule of
completeness survives Rule 106’s codification.”223 The court further
held that “any such common law rule cannot be used to justify the admission of inadmissible hearsay.”224
Nor is the Rule 611(a) solution any more obvious than the common law one. Rule 611(a) does not refer to completeness, and it is not
immediately evident that a lawyer can use that provision for relief
when the rule specifically on point does not provide protection. Both
lawyers and judges may be unaware that there is authority for completing oral statements outside Rule 106. Indeed, such unawareness
may explain the federal cases that simply deny completion of oral
statements because they are excluded from Rule 106 without any discussion of Rule 611(a) or the common law.225 And even for courts and
litigants aware of completion rights outside of Rule 106, bringing oral
221. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1984) (finding that common law
impeachment for bias continues under the Federal Rules of Evidence through Rule 402
which makes all relevant evidence admissible unless otherwise excluded despite omission of bias rule).
222. United States v. Oloyede, 933 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 2019).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 875 F.3d 179, 194 n.10 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting a completeness argument because Rule 106 applies only to written and recorded statements); United States v. Hayat, 710 F.3d 875, 895 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Our
cases have applied the rule of completeness ‘only to written and recorded statements.’”
(quoting United States v. Ortega, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000))); United States v.
Ramirez-Perez, 166 F.3d 1106, 1113 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Because the prosecutor questioned the agent only about what Maclavio said rather than about what was written in
the document, Rule 106 did not apply.”); United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696
(4th Cir. 1996) (finding no relief from a misleading presentation because the completing statement was unrecorded and omitted from Rule 106).
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statements within Rule 106’s orbit has the advantage of resolving all
completion issues through a single concise provision rather than according to a confusing patchwork of rules and common law.
Further, if Rule 106 is amended to allow completion over a hearsay objection, leaving oral statements out of Rule 106 becomes even
more problematic. Omitting oral statements from an amended Rule
106 would leave the hearsay issue unresolved with respect to oral
statements.226 Although courts might look to an amended Rule 106 for
guidance with respect to the hearsay issue in the context of oral statements still governed by Rule 611(a) and the common law, they might
just as easily reject completing oral statements on hearsay grounds
because the amendment declined to extend its new hearsay protection
to them. Adding oral statements to an amended Rule 106 that eliminates a hearsay objection to completing statements would create necessary parallel treatment of written, recorded and oral completing
statements.
2. Oral Statements and “Practical Concerns”
Amending Rule 106 to cover oral statements will provide immediate completeness protection for misleadingly presented oral statements in those jurisdictions that have denied the completion right
based solely on the omission of oral statements from Rule 106. Gathering the completion rights applicable to all statements, in whatever
form they are made, under a single user-friendly provision will also
aid judges and litigants in all jurisdictions and “promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing
a just determination.”227 Still, an amendment to Rule 106 that brings
oral statements within its protection must account for the “practical”
concerns that led the original drafters to shy away from them.
Although the Advisory Committee’s explanation for its choice to
omit oral statements from Rule 106 is cryptic to say the least, two primary concerns may have animated the decision. One possibility is that
rule-makers were apprehensive about time-consuming disputes
about the content of unrecorded oral statements—disputes that are
less likely to occur when a statement is committed to writing or otherwise recorded.228 Another related possibility is that the drafters had

226. See Oloyede, 933 F.3d at 314 (holding that the common law completion right
could not overcome hearsay doctrine).
227. FED. R. EVID. 102.
228. See United States v. Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d 661, 670 (D. Md. 2017) (“[T]he
‘practical reasons’ why oral conversations are excluded from Rule 106 undoubtedly
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it most prominently in mind to enact a rule that would mandate contemporaneous completion and reverse the common law reluctance to
allow a party to interrupt his adversary’s case to offer completing evidence.229 The drafters of Rule 106 may have foreseen obstacles to the
interruption of an opponent’s case to offer completing oral statements
and may have feared that the inclusion of oral statements would undermine the goal of mandating immediate completion. For example, a
litigant might need to complete an oral conversation by calling a different witness who was also present and could testify to the remainder of the conversation. It could be unduly disruptive to interrupt the
opponent’s case to present a witness. In contrast, immediate completion of a written or recorded statement may easily be accomplished
by requiring the original proponent to present a designated additional
portion of the written or recorded statement.
But neither of these concerns should stand in the way of amending Rule 106 to include oral statements. First, it is not at all clear that
difficulties of proof were at the heart of the Advisory Committee’s decision to reject completion of oral conversations. That same Committee proposed a rule on prior inconsistent statements that allowed oral,
unrecorded statements to be admissible for their truth.230 There was
no concern expressed about the potential difficulty in proving such
statements, and it could be expected that a witness being impeached
with a prior oral statement might deny having made it. In fact, the
problems raised by unrecorded statements offered to complete—
were they ever made, or are they being misreported—are problems
raised by every unrecorded statement reported in a court.231 There is
no sound reason for treating completing unrecorded statements differently from any other unrecorded statement routinely admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
More importantly, the experience of the many jurisdictions that
have permitted the completion of partial oral statements reveals no
time-consuming costly disputes over the content of incomplete oral
statements. As outlined above, several federal circuits currently permit the completion of misleading partial oral statements under the
include the need to avoid ‘he said, she said’ disputes about the content of an unrecorded or unwritten statement . . . .”).
229. See FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note (highlighting the “inadequacy
of repair work when delayed to a point later in the trial”).
230. See RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN & JOSHUA DEAHL, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: TEXT AND
HISTORY 326 (2015) (analyzing the Advisory Committee’s Revised Definitive Draft of
Rule 801(d)(1)(A)).
231. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (admitting all statements allegedly made
by a party opponent, whether recorded or unrecorded).
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authority of the common law or Rule 611(a).232 None of the reported
federal cases discuss a dispute between the parties about the content
of an unrecorded statement. This is, of course, not dispositive as to the
existence of such disputes because it is possible that some may not be
reported. Still, it demonstrates that there is no significant problem attending completion with oral unrecorded statements in those federal
jurisdictions that already allow it.233
Finally, to the extent that a dispute did arise concerning the content or existence of an oral statement, the difficulty of proof is a matter
that could be handled on a case-by-case basis under Rule 403.234 The
fairness rationale of Rule 106 should apply to completing unrecorded
statements, unless the court finds that the probative value of the completion is substantially outweighed by the difficulties and uncertainties of proving what was said in a given case.
The impracticality of contemporaneous completion or interruption with unrecorded statements likewise should not stand in the way
of amending Rule 106 to include such statements. The existing language of Rule 106 requires immediate completion of written and recorded statements “at that time.”235 Although some courts have read
that language literally and have required completion to be contemporaneous, others have applied Rule 106 more flexibly and have allowed
an opponent to offer completing evidence at a later time.236 With respect to unrecorded oral statements not currently covered by Rule
106, the courts that permit completion under the common law or under Rule 611(a) allow needed flexibility as to timing.237 And the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 106 expressly provide that “[t]he rule
232. See supra notes 108–18.
233. See Bailey, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 670 (“Moreover, if the content of some oral statements are disputed and difficult to prove, others are not—because they have been
summarized (for example, in a FBI agent’s form 302 summary of the defendant’s confession), or because they were witnessed by enough people to assure that what was
actually said can be established with sufficient certainty.”).
234. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing courts to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed” by dangers, such as unfair prejudice, confusion, and waste of time).
235. FED. R. EVID. 106.
236. Compare United States v. Larranaga, 787 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the defendant lost his one opportunity to introduce completing hearsay because
he waited until redirect to demand completion), with United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d
698, 706 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that that the judge has “discretion to determine
whether and when the curative evidence should be admitted”).
237. See Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171 (1988) (holding that it was an
error to exclude the completing information when it was offered later on cross-examination).

2020]

EVIDENTIARY IRONY

955

does not in any way circumscribe the right of the adversary to develop
the matter on cross-examination or as part of his own case.”238
Therefore, an amended Rule 106 could extend the completion
right to misleading oral statements by eliminating the rigid timing requirement in the existing provision. An amended provision could preserve the important right to interruption in the circumstances where
it can be enforced effectively while vesting the trial judge with discretion to delay completion to a later time when an opponent prefers a
delay or when the impracticality of completing oral statements requires one. In fact, this is the typical approach to the timing of completion in the federal courts today. Memorializing it in rule text that can
be applied consistently across circuits is not only feasible, but advisable.
Notably, several states have advanced beyond Federal Rule 106
and have extended their evidentiary provisions regarding completion
to oral statements without complication or controversy.239 Although
the Wisconsin rule of completeness originally mirrored Federal Rule
106,240 it was amended in 2017 to bring oral statements expressly
238. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note.
239. See CAL. CODE EVID. § 356 (Deering 2020) (“Where part of an act, declaration,
conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party . . . .”); CONN. CODE EVID. § 1-5 (2018)
(“When a statement is introduced by a party, the court may, and upon request shall,
require the proponent at that time to introduce any other part of the statement,
whether or not otherwise admissible . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-822 (2020) (“When
an admission is given in evidence by one party, it shall be the right of the other party
to have the whole admission and all the conversation connected therewith admitted
into evidence.”); IOWA R. EVID. 5.106 (2016) (“If a party introduces all or part of an act,
declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction . . . of any other part . . . .”); MONT. R. EVID. 106 (2019) (“When
part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or recorded statement or series
thereof is introduced by a party . . . an adverse party may inquire into or introduce any
other part of such item of evidence or series thereof.”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-106
(2020) (“When part of an act, declaration, conversation or writing is given in evidence
by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by the other.”); N.H.
R. EVID. 106 (2016) (“A party has a right to introduce the remainder of an unrecorded
statement or conversation that his or her opponent introduced [given it’s related to
the same subject matter and adds context].”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.040 (2019)
(“When part of an act, declaration, conversation or writing is given in evidence by one
party, the whole on the same subject, where otherwise admissible, may at that time be
inquired into be the other . . . .”); TEX. R. EVID. 107 (2020) (“An adverse party may also
introduce any other act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement that
is necessary to explain or allow the trier of fact to fully understand the part offered by
the opponent.”).
240. See State v. Eugenio, 579 N.W.2d 642, 649 n.6 (Wis. 1998) (noting that the
then-existing version of the Wisconsin rule of completeness was “identical” to Federal
Rule 106).
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within its reach.241 This was done to align the rule text with the Wisconsin cases, which have long permitted the admission of completing
oral statements.242 In State v. Eugenio,243 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court acknowledged that the fairness rationale supporting completion of written and recorded statements applies equally when oral
statements are presented to the fact-finder out of context.244 Similarly,
the New Hampshire rule of completeness was amended in 2017 to add
a right to complete “unrecorded statements or conversations.”245 According to the commentary to the rule, the amendment was designed
to bring the New Hampshire evidence rule into line with the common
law of New Hampshire that permits the completion of oral statements.246
The reported cases in the state jurisdictions that have embraced
the completion of purely oral statements reveal no messy trial disputes regarding the content of oral statements.247 Further, these state
jurisdictions have handled the timing issues that attend the completion of oral statements with ease, allowing completion during crossexamination of a witness or during the completing party’s case rather
than requiring interruption of the proponent’s presentation in all

241. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 901.07 (West 2019) (“When any part of a writing or statement, whether recorded or unrecorded, is introduced by a party, an adverse party may
require the party at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it to provide
context or prevent distortion.” (emphasis added)).
242. See State v. Sharp, 511 N.W.2d 316, 322 (Wis. App. 1993) (explaining that the
rule of completeness was recognized in the common law of Wisconsin since at least
1872 and that the common law of completion was not limited to written statements,
but encompassed conversations).
243. Eugenio, 579 N.W.2d at 409.
244. Id. (quoting 7 DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN EVIDENCE § 107.1, at 32 (1991)).
245. N.H. R. EVID. 106(b) (“A party has a right to introduce the remainder of an unrecorded statement or conversation that his or her opponent introduced so far as it
relates: (1) to the same subject matter; and (2) tends to explain or shed light on the
meaning of the part already received.”).
246. See N.H. R. EVID. 106 commentary (“The addition of (b), not included in Federal Rule of Evidence 106, codifies New Hampshire case law as set forth in State v.
Lopez, 156 N.H. 416, 421 (2007).”); see also State v. Warren, 732 A.2d 1017, 1020 (N.H.
1999) (“The defendant argues that while Rule 106 permits a party in certain circumstances to require an opponent to introduce simultaneously with a writing or recorded
statement other related writings or recorded statements, the completeness doctrine
applies to any verbal utterance. We agree.”).
247. See, e.g., Warren, 732 A.2d at 1020 (finding that defendant’s oral exculpatory
statements served to place his expression of remorse for killing in context and were
part of the same conversation and that these oral statements should have been admitted under the doctrine of completeness).
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circumstances.248 Although the Federal Rules of Evidence were designed as models for state practice, the states can serve as real-world
laboratories to test alterations and advancements in evidentiary practice.249 Where several states have already extended their rules of completeness to cover unrecorded oral statements without any adverse
consequences, Federal Rule of Evidence 106 may safely follow suit.
IV. THE OPTIMAL AMENDMENT TO COMPLETE THE RULE OF
COMPLETENESS
As surprisingly complicated as the issues surrounding the doctrine of completeness may be, an amendment that would resolve those
issues would be relatively simple to draft.250 Updated rule text would
need to address only three things:
First, it would need to clarify that a completing statement may be
admitted on the same basis as the originally introduced portion of the
statement and that completion necessary for fairness defeats a hearsay objection.
Second, an amendment would need to expand the scope of Rule
106 to cover incomplete unrecorded oral statements.
Finally, an amendment should preserve an adversary’s right to
contemporaneous completion in appropriate circumstances, while expressly granting flexibility to permit delayed completion when necessary.
An amended Rule 106 could be drafted as follows:
Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
a) Introducing the Statement. If a party introduces all or part of
a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction of or may introduce require the introduction, at that time,
of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that
248. See, e.g., CONN. CODE EVID. Sec. 1-5(b) commentary (“Unlike subsection (a),
subsection (b) does not involve the contemporaneous introduction of evidence. Rather, it recognizes the right of a party to subsequently introduce another part or the
remainder of a statement previously introduced in part by the opposing party under
the conditions prescribed in the rule.”).
249. See supra note 152.
250. Many thanks to Ed Cheng and Brooke Bowerman for helpful feedback on an
earlier draft of our proposed amendment language. We modified our proposed language slightly based upon their sage observations. See Edward K. Cheng & Brooke
Bowerman, Completing the Quantum of Evidence, 105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES (forthcoming 2021).
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in fairness ought to be considered together with the initially introduced statement. at the same time The adverse party may do so even
if the completing statement is otherwise inadmissible under the rule
against hearsay.
b) Timing the Introduction. The completing statement should
be admitted at the same time as the initial statement. But the court
may, in its discretion, allow completion at a later time.
An Advisory Committee note to an amended rule should emphasize the fairness-forfeiture justification for allowing a completing remainder to be admitted on the same basis as the originally introduced
statement and highlight the inequities in the precedent that has prevented completion on hearsay grounds. The note should make clear
that some remainders may create a fair and accurate picture of a previously introduced statement if they are introduced only for their nonhearsay value in showing context. For example, if the original partial
statement was introduced only to show its effect on some party to the
case, a remainder may need to be introduced only for a similar nonhearsay purpose to give an accurate picture of the impact of the statement. But to the extent that the original statement was presented for
its truth, a completing remainder required by fairness should be available for the same purpose.
The Advisory Committee note should also explain that the
amendment brings oral statements within the protection of the Rule
to collect completion rights under a single user-friendly rule and to
avoid the need to consult Rule 611(a) or the common law. The note
should point out that the completion of oral statements is already permitted in the majority of federal jurisdictions and that the addition of
oral statements to Rule 106 does not alter the standards applicable to
the completion of oral statements.
The Advisory Committee note should also instruct judges and
lawyers as to the timing requirements of an amended Rule 106. It
would need to emphasize the importance of immediate interruption
with a completing remainder that has been the cornerstone of Rule
106 since its adoption. The retention of the right to contemporaneous
completion in most circumstances is necessary to avoid a delay that
might hamper an adversary’s ability to avoid a misleading impression.
Still, the note should signal that trial judges possess the discretion to
permit or require delayed completion to avoid inefficient disruption
or other problems of proof.
Finally, despite all the alterations to Rule 106 that such an
amendment would bring, it would not and should not alter the
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longstanding and narrow fairness standard that opens the door to
completion in the first place. A Committee note should reiterate that
fairness requires completion under the amended provision only when
the initial presentation creates a misleading impression and distorts
the true import of the statement—it is the misleading nature of the
original presentation that justifies the forfeiture basis for completion.
All of the revisions to Rule 106 would address the proper operation of
completeness only after that narrow standard has been triggered.
CONCLUSION
Rule 106, as originally enacted, represented a “partial” codification of the common law doctrine of completion. It was designed primarily to address a timing concern and to allow interruption of an adversary’s case to offer completing evidence. Accordingly, Rule 106 left
thorny issues, such as the interaction between completion and the
hearsay rule and the completion of oral statements, to the common
law. Although a minimalist approach to evidence rulemaking is often
preferable to preserve flexibility in the proof process, the lesson of the
last forty-five years is that the “partial codification” of completion has
caused serious confusion and sometimes genuine injustice. Remaining
silent about the hearsay issue has caused courts like the Sixth Circuit
to conclude that completing evidence must be “otherwise admissible,”
which appears to be at odds with the common law and with the drafters’ intent and defeats the fundamental fairness purpose of the Rule.
“Partial codification” has led to a court finding that the completion
right is lost if not advanced contemporaneously, a holding that appears to be inconsistent with the intent of the drafters to create a right
to interrupt, but not to eliminate a completion opportunity if not
sought immediately. Finally, leaving “oral” statements out of the “partial codification” has led to some courts finding no completion right for
oral statements and to others using the common law and Rule 611(a)
to fill in the gaps, thus creating a fragmented rule of completion and a
trap for the unwary.
The amendment to Rule 106 proposed in this Article would create a much fuller codification of completion than the partial one initially attempted. Indeed, it should mean that there is no common law
of completeness remaining. That move is needed to resolve the ambiguities and inaccuracies the partial codification has engendered. An
incomplete rule of completeness has proven to be an evidentiary irony
that has hampered the just and efficient operation of the trial process.
This nagging and important issue is addressed by amending Rule 106
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to provide a meaningful remedy for a misleading presentation of a
statement.

